CVE-2024-47878

Impact

### Summary The `/extension/gdata/authorized` endpoint includes the `state` GET parameter verbatim in a `<script>` tag in the output, so without escaping. An attacker could lead or redirect a user to a crafted URL containing JavaScript code, which would then cause that code to be executed in the victim's browser as if it was part of OpenRefine. ### Details The `state` GET parameter is read from: * extensions/gdata/module/MOD-INF/controller.js:105 It is used (as `$state`) in: * extensions/gdata/module/authorized.vt:43 There is no check that the state has the expected format (base64-encoded JSON with values like "openrefine123..." and "cb123..."), or that the page was indeed opened as part of the authorization flow. ### PoC Navigate to: http://localhost:3333/extension/gdata/authorized?state=%22,alert(1),%22&error= An alert box pops up. The gdata extension needs to be present. No other configuration is needed; specifically, it is not required to have a client ID or client secret set. ### Impact Execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the user's browser. The attacker-provided code can do anything the user can do, including deleting projects, retrieving database passwords, or executing arbitrary Jython or Closure expressions, if those extensions are also present.

Affected packages

Affected products

Weakness classification

References

• NVD record
• CVE.org record
• GitHub advisory
• https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine/commit/10bf0874d67f1018a58b3732332d76b840192fea
• https://github.com/OpenRefine/OpenRefine/security/advisories/GHSA-pw3x-c5vp-mfc3
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pw3x-c5vp-mfc3
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47878