CVE-2020-5222
Hard-Coded Key Used For Remember-me Token in Opencast
Auswirkung
### Impact The security configuration in `etc/security/mh_default_org.xml` enables a remember-me cookie based on a hash created from the [username, password, and an additional system key](https://docs.spring.io/spring-security/site/docs/3.0.x/reference/remember-me.html). Opencast has hard-coded this system key in the large XML file and never mentions to change this, basically ensuring that all systems use the same key: ```xml <sec:remember-me key="opencast" user-service-ref="userDetailsService" /> ``` This means that an attacker getting access to a remember-me token for one server can get access to all servers which allow log-in using the same credentials without ever needing the credentials. For example, a remember-me token obtained from develop.opencast.org can be used on stable.opencast.org without actually knowing the log-in credentials. Such an attack will usually not work on different installations – assuming that safe, unique passwords are used – but it is basically guaranteed to work to get access to all machines of one cluster if a token from one machine is compromised. ### Patches This problem is fixed in Opencast 7.6 and Opencast 8.1 ### Workarounds We strongly recommend updating to the patched version. Still, as a workaround for older versions, in `etc/security/mh_default_org.xml`, set a custom key for each server: ```xml <sec:remember-me key="CUSTOM_RANDOM_KEY" user-service-ref="userDetailsService" /> ``` ### References - [Relevant lines in the security configuration](https://github.com/opencast/opencast/blob/161ee619382f144dc35eea211fc6b556025b98e1/etc/security/mh_default_org.xml#L335-L336) - [Spring Security Remember-Me Authentication Documentation](https://docs.spring.io/spring-security/site/docs/3.0.x/reference/remember-me.html#remember-me-hash-token) ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Open an issue in [opencast/opencast](https://github.com/opencast/opencast/issues) - For security-relevant information, email us at [security@opencast.org](mailto:security@opencast.org) ### Thanks Thanks to @LukasKalbertodt for reporting the issue.
Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke über das Netzwerk ausnutzen, mit einem normalen Benutzerkonto, allerdings muss ein Nutzer etwas tun, etwa eine Datei oder einen Link öffnen. Bei Erfolg: hohes Risiko, dass Daten ausgelesen werden. Der Angriff kann über die verwundbare Komponente hinaus wirken.
Betroffene Pakete
| Ökosystem | Paket | Betroffen | Behoben in |
|---|---|---|---|
| maven | org.opencastproject:opencast-kernel | < 7.6 | 7.6 |
Betroffene Produkte · Apereo
| Produkt | Betroffene Versionen |
|---|---|
| Opencast | vor 7.6 Version 8.0 |