CVE-2025-69263
pnpm Has Lockfile Integrity Bypass that Allows Remote Dynamic Dependencies
Auswirkung
### Summary HTTP tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are stored in the lockfile without integrity hashes. This allows the remote server to serve different content on each install, even when a lockfile is committed. ### Details When a package depends on an HTTP tarball URL, pnpm's tarball resolver returns only the URL without computing an integrity hash: `resolving/tarball-resolver/src/index.ts`: ```javascript return { resolution: { tarball: resolvedUrl, // No integrity field }, resolvedVia: 'url', } ``` The resulting lockfile entry has no integrity to verify: ```yaml remote-dynamic-dependency@http://example.com/pkg.tgz: resolution: {tarball: http://example.com/pkg.tgz} version: 1.0.0 ``` Since there is no integrity hash, pnpm cannot detect when the server returns different content. This affects: - HTTP/HTTPS tarball URLs (`"pkg": "https://example.com/pkg.tgz"`) - Git shorthand dependencies (`"pkg": "github:user/repo"`) - Git URLs (`"pkg": "git+https://github.com/user/repo"`) npm registry packages are not affected as they include integrity hashes from the registry metadata. ### PoC See attached [pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/23819648/pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc.zip) The POC includes: - A server that returns different tarball content on each request - A `malicious-package` that depends on the HTTP tarball - A `victim` project that depends on `malicious-package` To run: ```bash cd pnpm-bypass-integrity-poc ./run-poc.sh ``` The output shows that each install (with `pnpm store prune` between them) downloads different code despite having a committed lockfile. ### Impact An attacker who publishes a package with an HTTP tarball dependency can serve different code to different users or CI/CD environments. This enables: - Targeted attacks based on request metadata (IP, headers, timing) - Evasion of security audits (serve benign code during review, malicious code later) - Supply chain attacks where the malicious payload changes over time The attack requires the victim to install a package that has an HTTP/git tarball in its dependency tree. The victim's lockfile provides no protection.
Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke über das Netzwerk ausnutzen, ohne Anmeldung, allerdings muss ein Nutzer etwas tun, etwa eine Datei oder einen Link öffnen. Dafür müssen bestimmte Bedingungen erfüllt sein, was einen Angriff erschwert. Bei Erfolg: hohes Risiko, dass Daten ausgelesen werden, hohes Risiko, dass Daten oder Systeme verändert werden, hohes Risiko für Ausfälle.
Betroffene Pakete
| Ökosystem | Paket | Betroffen | Behoben in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | pnpm | < 10.26.0 | 10.26.0 |
Betroffene Produkte · Pnpm
| Produkt | Betroffene Versionen |
|---|---|
| Pnpm | vor 10.26.0 |
Schwachstellenklasse
Referenzen
- NVD-Eintrag
- CVE.org-Eintrag
- GitHub-Advisory
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/commit/0958027f88a99ccefe7e9676cdebba393dfbdc85
- https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-69263
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2427703
- https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2025/cve-2025-69263.json
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7vhp-vf5g-r2fw
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69263