NetSight
mittel5.9

CVE-2026-111753

Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages.

Auswirkung

An incomplete fix for [GHSA-58c5-g7wp-6w37](https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-58c5-g7wp-6w37) (`CVE-2025-66035`) in `@angular/common`'s HTTP Client (`HttpClient`) allows Cross-Site Request Forgery (XSRF) tokens to be leaked to attacker-controlled cross-origin domains when requests use URLs that exploit parsing discrepancies between regular expressions and the browser's WHATWG URL parser. ### Technical Description To address `CVE-2025-66035`, `xsrfInterceptorFn` introduced a regular expression (`const ABSOLUTE_URL_REGEX = /^(?:https?:)?\/\//i`) to detect and skip absolute and protocol-relative URLs before attaching the `X-XSRF-TOKEN` header. However, browsers resolve request URLs passed to `fetch()` and `XMLHttpRequest.open()` using the **WHATWG URL parser**. For `http:` and `https:` schemes, the WHATWG URL standard performs several normalizations prior to resolving the authority/origin: * Backslashes (`\`) are treated as forward slashes (`/`) — e.g., `/\evil.example/x`, `\\evil.example/x`, `\/evil.example/x`, `https:\\evil.example/x`, `https:/\evil.example/x`. * Leading and trailing C0 control characters and spaces (`<= 0x20`) are stripped — e.g., `' //evil.example/x'`, `'\0//evil.example/x'`, `'\x1f//evil.example/x'`. * ASCII tab (`\t`), newline (`\n`), and carriage return (`\r`) characters are removed anywhere in the input — e.g., `'/\t/evil.example/x'`, `'/\n/evil.example/x'`, `'htt\tps://evil.example/x'`. Because these URLs do not match `/^(?:https?:)?\/\//i`, `xsrfInterceptorFn` treats them as relative same-origin URLs and attaches the `X-XSRF-TOKEN` header, while the browser resolves and dispatches the request to the cross-origin host (`evil.example`). Note: Angular `21.0.3+` and `22.x` replaced the regular expression with a WHATWG `new URL(req.url, locationOrigin)` origin comparison in [#65683](https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/65683) and were already unaffected. However, the `20.3.x` LTS branch retained the regular expression until `20.3.34`. ### Impact The token leakage bypasses Angular's built-in XSRF protection on affected versions, allowing an attacker to capture the user's valid `X-XSRF-TOKEN` header if their server permits the request and custom header via CORS. Once obtained, the attacker can perform Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks against the victim user's session. ### Attack Preconditions 1. The victim's Angular application must have **XSRF protection enabled** (enabled by default in `HttpClient`). 2. The attacker must be able to make the application send a state-changing HTTP request (e.g., `POST`, `PUT`, `DELETE`, `PATCH`) to a URL they control (such as `/\attacker.example/api` or ` //attacker.example/api`). ### Patches The issue is resolved by parsing and comparing the request URL's origin against the application's current origin using the standard `URL` constructor (`new URL(req.url, locationOrigin)`). * `21.0.3` (and all `22.x` releases) * `20.3.34` ### Workarounds If you cannot immediately upgrade to a patched version: * Validate and normalize outgoing request URLs using `new URL(url, window.location.origin)` and verify that `parsedUrl.origin === window.location.origin` before passing dynamic URLs to mutating `HttpClient` requests. * Avoid passing untrusted or user-controlled URLs to `HttpClient` mutating methods.

Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke über das Netzwerk ausnutzen, ohne Anmeldung, allerdings muss ein Nutzer aktiv etwas tun, etwa eine Datei oder einen Link öffnen. Dafür müssen bestimmte Bedingungen erfüllt sein, was einen Angriff erschwert. Bei Erfolg: hohes Risiko, dass Daten ausgelesen werden.

Betroffene Pakete

ÖkosystemPaketBetroffenBehoben in
npm@angular/common>= 21.0.0, < 21.0.321.0.3

Betroffene Produkte · Angular

ProduktBetroffene Versionen
Angular
ab 20.0.0, vor 20.3.34
ab 21.0.0, vor 21.0.3
Versionen <= 19.2.25, ≤ 19.2.25

Schwachstellenklasse

Referenzen