CVE-2026-26013
LangChain affected by SSRF via image_url token counting in ChatOpenAI.get_num_tokens_from_messages
Auswirkung
## Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in ChatOpenAI Image Token Counting ### Summary The `ChatOpenAI.get_num_tokens_from_messages()` method fetches arbitrary `image_url` values without validation when computing token counts for vision-enabled models. This allows attackers to trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks by providing malicious image URLs in user input. ### Severity **Low** - The vulnerability allows SSRF attacks but has limited impact due to: - Responses are not returned to the attacker (blind SSRF) - Default 5-second timeout limits resource exhaustion - Non-image responses fail at PIL image parsing ### Impact An attacker who can control image URLs passed to `get_num_tokens_from_messages()` can: - Trigger HTTP requests from the application server to arbitrary internal or external URLs - Cause the server to access internal network resources (private IPs, cloud metadata endpoints) - Cause minor resource consumption through image downloads (bounded by timeout) **Note:** This vulnerability occurs during token counting, which may happen outside of model invocation (e.g., in logging, metrics, or token budgeting flows). ### Details The vulnerable code path: 1. `get_num_tokens_from_messages()` processes messages containing `image_url` content blocks 2. For images without `detail: "low"`, it calls `_url_to_size()` to fetch the image and compute token counts 3. `_url_to_size()` performs `httpx.get(image_source)` on any URL without validation 4. Prior to the patch, there was no SSRF protection, size limits, or explicit timeout **File:** `libs/partners/openai/langchain_openai/chat_models/base.py` ### Patches The vulnerability has been patched in `langchain-openai==1.1.9` (requires `langchain-core==1.2.11`). The patch adds: 1. **SSRF validation** using `langchain_core._security._ssrf_protection.validate_safe_url()` to block: - Private IP ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local) - Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, etc.) - Invalid URL schemes 2. **Explicit size limits** (50 MB maximum, matching OpenAI's payload limit) 3. **Explicit timeout** (5 seconds, same as `httpx.get` default) 4. **Allow disabling image fetching** via `allow_fetching_images=False` parameter ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately: 1. **Sanitize input:** Validate and filter `image_url` values before passing messages to token counting or model invocation 2. **Use network controls:** Implement egress filtering to prevent outbound requests to private IPs
Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke über das Netzwerk ausnutzen, ohne Anmeldung, ohne Zutun eines Nutzers. Dafür müssen bestimmte Bedingungen erfüllt sein, was einen Angriff erschwert. Bei Erfolg: geringes Risiko für Ausfälle.
Betroffene Pakete
| Ökosystem | Paket | Betroffen | Behoben in |
|---|---|---|---|
| pip | langchain-core | < 1.2.11 | 1.2.11 |
Betroffene Produkte · Langchain
| Produkt | Betroffene Versionen |
|---|---|
| Langchain Core | vor 1.2.11 |
Schwachstellenklasse
Referenzen
- NVD-Eintrag
- CVE.org-Eintrag
- GitHub-Advisory
- https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/commit/2b4b1dc29a833d4053deba4c2b77a3848c834565
- https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/releases/tag/langchain-core%3D%3D1.2.11
- https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/security/advisories/GHSA-2g6r-c272-w58r
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2g6r-c272-w58r
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26013