NetSight
mittel6.5

CVE-2026-32761

File Browser has an Authorization Policy Bypass in Public Share Download Flow

Auswirkung

### Summary A permission enforcement flaw allows users without download privileges (`download=false`) to still expose and retrieve file content via public share links when they retain share privileges (`share=true`). This bypasses intended access control policy and enables unauthorized data exfiltration to unauthenticated users. Where download restrictions are used for data-loss prevention or role separation. ### Details The backend applies inconsistent authorization checks across download paths: - Direct raw download correctly enforces `Perm.Download`: - [[raw.go](https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/blob/master/http/raw.go#82)](filebrowser/http/raw.go:82) - Share creation only enforces `Perm.Share`: - [[share.go](https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/blob/master/http/share.go#21)](filebrowser/http/share.go:21) - Public share/download handlers serve shared content without verifying owner `Perm.Download`: - [public.go](https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/blob/master/http/public.go#18)(filebrowser/http/public.go:18) - [public.go](https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/blob/master/http/public.go#116)(filebrowser/http/public.go:116) As a result, a user who is blocked from direct downloads can create a share and obtain the same file via `/api/public/dl/<hash>`. ### PoC 1. Create a non-admin user with: - `perm.share = true` - `perm.download = false` 2. Login as that user and upload a **PDF** file: - `POST /api/resources/nodl_secret_<rand>.pdf` with `Content-Type: application/pdf` 3. Verify direct raw download is denied: - `GET /api/raw/nodl_secret_<rand>.pdf` - Expected and observed: `202 Accepted` (blocked) 4. Create share for same file: - `POST /api/share/nodl_secret_<rand>.pdf` - Observed: `200`, response includes `hash` (example: `qxfK3JMG`) 5. Download publicly without authentication: - `GET /api/public/dl/<hash>` - Observed (vulnerable): `200`, `Content-Type: application/pdf`, and PDF bytes are returned Live evidence captured (March 1, 2026): - `create user`: `201` - `create file`: `200` - `direct /api/raw`: `202 Accepted` - `create share`: `200` - `public download /api/public/dl/mxK-ppZb`: `200` - `public download content-type`: `application/pdf` - `public download body length`: `327` bytes ### Impact This is an **access control / authorization policy bypass** vulnerability. - **Who can exploit:** Any authenticated user granted `share=true` but denied `download`. - **Who is impacted:** Operators and organizations relying on download restrictions to prevent data export. - **What can happen:** Restricted users can still distribute and retrieve files publicly, including unauthenticated access through share URLs.

Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke über das Netzwerk ausnutzen, mit einem normalen Benutzerkonto, ohne Zutun eines Nutzers. Bei Erfolg: hohes Risiko, dass Daten ausgelesen werden.

Betroffene Pakete

ÖkosystemPaketBetroffenBehoben in
gohttps://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser<= 2.61.0nicht erfasst

Betroffene Produkte · Filebrowser

ProduktBetroffene Versionen
Filebrowser
vor 2.62.0

Schwachstellenklasse

Referenzen