CVE-2026-67543
Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure.
Auswirkung
Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (python_tool_executor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skill_python_executor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation — only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist — so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.
Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke über das Netzwerk ausnutzen, mit einem normalen Benutzerkonto, ohne Zutun eines Nutzers. Bei Erfolg: hohes Risiko, dass Daten ausgelesen werden, hohes Risiko, dass Daten oder Systeme verändert werden, hohes Risiko für Ausfälle.
Betroffene Produkte · Heymrun
| Produkt | Betroffene Versionen |
|---|---|
| Heym | vor 0.0.70 Version < 0.0.70 |
Schwachstellenklasse
Referenzen
- NVD-Eintrag
- CVE.org-Eintrag
- https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-hcv7-mg77-pg73
- https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/2155057f4153a1e3a7b789d104f7fa96e92964e5
- https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/28bb2901e4dea128ac493f67ee9478d230b7a3d7
- https://github.com/heymrun/heym/releases/tag/0.0.70