NetSight
hoch7.1

CVE-2026-77763

The filestore backend in pkg/object/file.go, used for file:// stores and as a common juicefs sync destination, derived every operation's target from path(key),…

Auswirkung

The filestore backend in pkg/object/file.go, used for file:// stores and as a common juicefs sync destination, derived every operation's target from path(key), which returned either filepath.Join(d.root, key) or filepath.Clean(d.root + key) with no check that the result stayed beneath the root. Put, Get, Head, Delete, Chmod, Chown, Symlink and Readlink all consumed that value directly. Object keys enumerated from a source object store during a sync are not constrained the way local filesystem names are, so a key containing traversal segments causes juicefs to write attacker-supplied content to a path outside the intended local destination, and no error is returned. An operator syncing from a bucket whose contents they do not fully control, such as a shared or public bucket or one an attacker can write to, is therefore exposed to a file write at an attacker-influenced location. The fix changes path() to return an error and rejects any key whose resolved path escapes the root.

Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke über das Netzwerk ausnutzen, ohne Anmeldung, allerdings muss ein Nutzer beteiligt sein, etwa indem er Inhalte ansieht. Bei Erfolg: hohes Risiko, dass Daten oder Systeme verändert werden.

Betroffene Produkte · Juicedata

ProduktBetroffene Versionen
Juicefs
Version 0 ≤1.4.1

Schwachstellenklasse

Referenzen