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niedrigNoch keine CVE

GHSA-59xv-588h-2vmm

@saltcorn/data vulnerable to SQL Injection via jsexprToSQL Literal Handler

Auswirkung

## Summary The `jsexprToSQL()` function in Saltcorn converts JavaScript expressions to SQL for use in database constraints. The `Literal` handler wraps string values in single quotes without escaping embedded single quotes, allowing SQL injection when creating Formula-type table constraints. ## Vulnerable Component **File:** `packages/saltcorn-data/models/expression.ts`, lines 117-118 ```typescript Literal({ value }: { value: ExtendedNode }) { if (typeof value == "string") return `'${value}'`; // NO ESCAPING! return `${value}`; }, ``` **Call chain:** Formula constraint creation → `table_constraints.ts:127` → `jsexprToSQL()` → `Literal()` → `db.query()` executes unsanitized SQL. ## Proof of Concept ### Injection via Formula Constraint When an admin creates a Formula-type table constraint with the expression: ```javascript name === "test' OR '1'='1" ``` The `jsexprToSQL()` function generates: ```sql (name)=('test' OR '1'='1') ``` This is then executed as: ```sql ALTER TABLE "tablename" ADD CONSTRAINT "tablename_fml_1" CHECK ((name)=('test' OR '1'='1')); ``` The single quote in the string literal is not escaped, breaking out of the SQL string context. ### More Dangerous Payload ```javascript name === "'; DROP TABLE users; --" ``` Generates: ```sql (name)=(''; DROP TABLE users; --') ``` ### Verified on Saltcorn v1.5.0 (Docker) Direct invocation of `jsexprToSQL()` inside the running container confirms the vulnerability: ``` Input: name === "hello" Output: (name)=('hello') ← Normal Input: name === "test' OR '1'='1" Output: (name)=('test' OR '1'='1') ← Single quote NOT escaped, OR injected Input: name === "'; DROP TABLE users; --" Output: (name)=(''; DROP TABLE users; --') ← DROP TABLE injected ``` The test was performed on a completely fresh Saltcorn installation (zero user-created tables, default Docker setup). ### PoC Screenshot 1. Create a table after moving to the table menu <img width="1194" height="559" alt="SCR-20260307-edqn" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a2d11102-f49b-4b2b-88ff-fced37476b6f" /> 2. Go to the table and then to `Constraits` <img width="1180" height="600" alt="SCR-20260307-edsg" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b55ddace-01be-4a53-8f62-cbec98172cd7" /> 3. Go to `Formula` <img width="1130" height="518" alt="SCR-20260307-edud" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8a5addc6-e681-401b-91ea-bce3b0eece54" /> 4. Create a test table for verification <img width="857" height="294" alt="SCR-20260307-eetw" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/debc8581-8145-44cb-a684-2bc3eb7adbcf" /> 5. Input the payload and save <img width="763" height="383" alt="SCR-20260307-ehcz" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f7a3aa34-7b0b-48ea-b1df-f852f137c37f" /> 6. Check the table for testing <img width="549" height="256" alt="SCR-20260307-ehuh" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8f6da842-0275-4729-93bf-96575f3fe963" /> ## Impact - Arbitrary SQL execution via crafted CHECK constraints - Data exfiltration through error-based or time-based SQL injection - Database schema manipulation (DROP TABLE, ALTER TABLE) - Potential privilege escalation via direct `users` table modification ## Suggested Remediation Escape single quotes in the `Literal` handler: ```typescript Literal({ value }: { value: ExtendedNode }) { if (typeof value == "string") return `'${value.replace(/'/g, "''")}'`; return `${value}`; }, ``` Alternatively, use parameterized queries for constraint creation instead of string interpolation.

Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke über das Netzwerk ausnutzen, mit einem Administratorkonto, ohne Zutun eines Nutzers.

Betroffene Pakete

ÖkosystemPaketBetroffenBehoben in
npm@saltcorn/data< 1.4.51.4.5
npm@saltcorn/data>= 1.5.0, < 1.5.51.5.5
npm@saltcorn/data>= 1.6.0-alpha.0, < 1.6.0-beta.41.6.0-beta.4

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