NetSight
hoch8.6Noch keine CVE

GHSA-5fqc-mrg8-w798

Dulwich: Symlink directory traversal in filter-branch index_filter via cross-commit state persistence

Auswirkung

## Summary Dulwich's `filter_branch.py` `CommitFilter._apply_index_filter()` is vulnerable to symlink directory traversal. When processing commit history, materialized tree entries (including symlinks) persist in the working directory between commits, allowing a symlink from an ancestor commit to redirect file writes from a descendant commit to arbitrary filesystem locations. ## Root Cause `_apply_index_filter()` at `dulwich/filter_branch.py:212` calls `build_index_from_tree(".", tmp_index_path, ...)` which materializes all tree entries to the current working directory. The `finally` block (line 229-230) only cleans up the temporary index file (`os.unlink(tmp_index_path)`) — NOT the filesystem files written to CWD. When `process_commit()` processes parents recursively first (line 260), files materialized from ancestor commits persist and affect processing of descendant commits. On dulwich 1.2.7, `build_file_from_blob()` has no symlink protection, and `validate_path_element` only validates name patterns, not filesystem state. ## Impact An attacker can craft a malicious repository where running `filter_branch` with an index filter writes attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem locations via symlink traversal. This achieves RCE if the write targets `.git/hooks/`. ## Attack Scenario 1. Attacker creates a repository where commit history (linearized) has: - Ancestor commit: tree entry `evil` (mode 120000, symlink → `/target_dir`) - Descendant commit: tree entry `evil/payload` (mode 100644, attacker content) 2. Victim clones repository and runs `filter_branch` with an index filter 3. `process_commit()` processes ancestor first → materializes `evil` as symlink to `/target_dir` in CWD 4. CWD is NOT cleaned between commits 5. Processing descendant: `os.path.exists("./evil")` → True (symlink exists). `build_file_from_blob(blob, mode, "./evil/payload")` → `open("./evil/payload", "wb")` follows intermediate symlink → writes to `/target_dir/payload` ## Suggested Fix Clean the CWD between commit iterations in `_apply_index_filter()`, or verify that no intermediate path components are symlinks before writing files. Reported by **zx (Jace)**

Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke mit lokalem Zugriff auf das System ausnutzen, ohne Anmeldung, allerdings muss ein Nutzer etwas tun, etwa eine Datei oder einen Link öffnen. Bei Erfolg: hohes Risiko, dass Daten ausgelesen werden, hohes Risiko, dass Daten oder Systeme verändert werden, hohes Risiko für Ausfälle. Der Angriff kann über die verwundbare Komponente hinaus wirken.

Betroffene Pakete

ÖkosystemPaketBetroffenBehoben in
pipdulwich>= 0.23.1, <= 1.2.71.2.8

Schwachstellenklasse

Referenzen