GHSA-763v-5pjm-fx36
Strands Agents: Default FileSessionManager storage is world-readable on shared systems
Auswirkung
There is a local confidentiality issue in the default `FileSessionManager` storage behavior. By default it writes session data under `/tmp/strands/sessions` and relies on the process umask for directory and file permissions. On systems using the common `umask 022`, the session directories are `0755` and JSON files are `0644`, so other local users can read persisted agent session data. This matters on shared developer machines, CI hosts, notebooks, jump boxes, and multi-user GPU servers. Session storage is intended to persist conversation/history/state, so it can contain prompts, model output, tool inputs/outputs, intermediate state, and secrets that pass through the agent. Relevant code: - `strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py:58`: default storage path is `os.path.join(tempfile.gettempdir(), "strands/sessions")`. - `strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py:118`: creates parent directories without a private mode. - `strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py:121`: writes JSON files via normal `open(..., "w")`. - `strands-py/src/strands/session/file_session_manager.py:131`: creates session directories without a private mode. Local reproduction with `umask 022`: ```text default_storage_dir= /tmp/strands/sessions 0o755 /tmp/strands/sessions 0o755 /tmp/strands/sessions/session_codex_perm_poc 0o644 /tmp/strands/sessions/session_codex_perm_poc/session.json file_contains_secret= True ``` The fixture wrote a fake secret into the session dict to show that sensitive session fields are readable through the resulting file. Suggested fixes: - Use a private per-user data directory by default rather than `/tmp`, or create `/tmp/strands` and descendants with `0700`. - Write session JSON atomically with `0600` permissions. - Consider refusing to use an existing default storage directory if it is not owned by the current user or is group/world accessible. - Document that callers should set `storage_dir` explicitly when they need shared storage. This was reproduced on commit `dd7b41de38cb`.
Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke mit lokalem Zugriff auf das System ausnutzen, mit einem normalen Benutzerkonto, ohne Zutun eines Nutzers. Dafür müssen bestimmte Bedingungen erfüllt sein, was einen Angriff erschwert. Bei Erfolg: hohes Risiko, dass Daten ausgelesen werden.
Betroffene Pakete
| Ökosystem | Paket | Betroffen | Behoben in |
|---|---|---|---|
| pip | strands-agents | < 1.48.0 | 1.48.0 |
Schwachstellenklasse
Referenzen
- GitHub-Advisory
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-763v-5pjm-fx36
- https://github.com/strands-agents/harness-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-763v-5pjm-fx36
- https://github.com/strands-agents/harness-sdk/pull/2937
- https://github.com/strands-agents/harness-sdk/commit/8658b9e0d57427b77b69343262184d76d8e63e8f
- https://github.com/strands-agents/harness-sdk/releases/tag/python/v1.48.0