GHSA-97jj-33gv-5xf9
league/commonmark: DisallowedRawHtml bypassed when a disallowed tag name ends the raw-HTML literal
Auswirkung
## Summary The `DisallowedRawHtml` extension does not escape a disallowed tag when the tag name is the last thing in the raw HTML. A Markdown line containing just `<script` is emitted unchanged, and the next block can supply its attributes. With the shipped GFM defaults this allows stored XSS by anyone who can post Markdown. ## Details `DisallowedRawHtmlRenderer` escapes tags with this regex: ``` /<(\/?(?:title|textarea|style|xmp|iframe|noembed|noframes|script|plaintext)[\s\/>])/i ``` The trailing character class requires one character after the tag name. The block parser does not: `RegexHelper::PARTIAL_HTMLBLOCKOPEN` accepts end of line after a tag name, so `<script` alone opens an HTML block. Because a rendered `HtmlBlock` has no trailing newline, the regex has nothing to match and the `<` passes through. In the browser the newline is still present, so the tag name terminates there and whatever follows becomes attributes. This is the same filter that GHSA-4v6x-c7xx-hw9f fixed in 2.8.1. That fix widened the character class but still requires one character, so this case was not covered. ## Reproduction Render this with `GithubFlavoredMarkdownConverter` and default settings: ``` <div> <script <span src="/evil.js"> ``` Output: ```html <div> <script <span src="/evil.js"> ``` A browser parses that as `<script src="/evil.js">` with a junk `<span` attribute, and the script runs. `<iframe` with `<span onload="...">` works the same way and does not need a later `</script>` in the page. Control: `<script src="/evil.js"></script>` is correctly escaped to `<script src="/evil.js"></script>`. ## Affected versions 1.3.0 (when the extension was added) through the current release. The `</style` and mid-line forms are only affected as continuation lines inside an already-open HTML block. ## Preconditions - `html_input` is `allow` (the default) - The `DisallowedRawHtml` extension is active, which the GFM extension enables automatically - Untrusted users can post Markdown Setting `html_input` to `escape` or `strip` fully mitigates this. ## Suggested fix Allow end of string after the tag name: ```php $regex = \sprintf('/<(\/?(?:%s))([\s\/>]|$)/i', \implode('|', \array_map('preg_quote', $tags))); return \preg_replace($regex, '<$1$2', $rendered); ``` This escapes every bypass shape above and leaves `<div>`, `<scripts>` and `<span class="a">` untouched. The existing unit test only covers tag names followed by another character, so a case for a bare tag name should be added.
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Betroffene Pakete
| Ökosystem | Paket | Betroffen | Behoben in |
|---|---|---|---|
| composer | league/commonmark | >= 1.3.0, <= 2.10.1 | 2.10.2 |