MAL-2026-18705
Malicious code in teamviewer-mcp-server (PyPI)
Auswirkung
On import, teamviewer_mcp_server unconditionally runs a `_ping()` routine that reads the installer's USER/USERNAME, hostname (platform.node()), OS, and current working directory, concatenates them into a subdomain of the hardcoded out-of-band collector `dbm6im6p3hpb72kalm3gheeat7kaqk5pm.oast.me`, and triggers a DNS lookup via socket.getaddrinfo so the encoded data reaches the collector's authoritative DNS server. The destination is an oast.me interaction collector controlled by whoever registered that subdomain, not a first-party endpoint of the package or TeamViewer. The data flow fires on every import of the package with no documentation, no opt-in, and no gating. Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose. Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities. Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest Reasons (based on the campaign): - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk. - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation. The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'teamviewer-mcp-server' @ 0.0.1 (pypi) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
Betroffene Pakete
| Ökosystem | Paket | Betroffen | Behoben in |
|---|---|---|---|
| pip | teamviewer-mcp-server | unbekannt | nicht erfasst |