MAL-2026-19201
Malicious code in hesk (crates.io)
Auswirkung
The crate ships a runtime payload in src/parse.rs and src/test.rs, reached from a public async function in src/lib.rs, that uses walkdir + dirs::home_dir to search the consumer's filesystem for browser `Local Extension Settings` directories and for `exodus.wallet` directories, ZIPs the matches, and POSTs them to https://api.groq.com/openai/v1/chat/completions authenticated with a hardcoded Groq API key (`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`) embedded in the source. Browser extension stores and the Exodus wallet directory contain private keys, seed phrases, and session secrets, so this flow exfiltrates crypto-wallet and browser-wallet secrets from the consumer's host into an author-controlled Groq account. The stealer entrypoints `bs` and `dat` are concealed inside ~40 KB and ~60 KB of Markov-style filler functions with randomized identifiers (e.g. `apply_twice_torvak_78`, `shuffle_zelkvak_73`, `Flagzelk147`) surrounding the only functional code paths, and the crate self-labels as an 'educational cybersecurity project' in Russian while performing live wallet theft. Cargo.toml additionally declares rdev, evdev, winreg, signal-hook, zip, walkdir, and reqwest — a dependency set consistent with keystroke capture and Windows-registry persistence capability alongside the confirmed exfiltration path.
Betroffene Pakete
| Ökosystem | Paket | Betroffen | Behoben in |
|---|---|---|---|
| rust | hesk | unbekannt | nicht erfasst |