NetSight
medium5.3

CVE-2026-130161

Tamari is a fully-featured recipe manager web application built using Python and the Flask Framework.

Impact

Tamari is a fully-featured recipe manager web application built using Python and the Flask Framework. Prior to 1.7.2, an authenticated user can bypass the recipe-autofill SSRF check by submitting a hostname under the user's control through the Autofill from URL feature; the hostname can resolve to a public address during validation and a private or internal address during the later connection. In app/myrecipes/routes.py, is_safe_autofill_url validates the first DNS response, but recipe autofill passes the original URL to requests.get, which independently resolves the hostname and can connect to the internal address. The fetched response is parsed into recipe fields, enabling internal-service reconnaissance and potential data exposure; no redirect is required, and disabling redirects does not stop this DNS-rebinding bypass. This issue is fixed in 1.7.2.

An attacker can exploit this over the network, with a regular user account, without any action by a user. Specific conditions have to be met, which makes an attack harder. If it succeeds: high risk of data being read.

Affected products · Alexbates

ProductAffected versions
Tamari
before 1.7.2
Version < 1.7.2

Weakness classification

References