GHSA-7cx2-g3h9-382p
Crawl4AI: Arbitrary file write (symlink/TOCTOU) plus log and webhook-header injection in Docker server
Impact
### Summary Three backward-compatible hardening fixes in the Docker API server. The headline issue is an arbitrary file write via the screenshot/PDF `output_path`. ### 1. Arbitrary file write via output_path symlink / TOCTOU (primary) `POST /screenshot` and `POST /pdf` accept an `output_path` constrained to `ALLOWED_OUTPUT_DIR` by `validate_output_path`. The 0.8.7 check was string-only: it did not resolve symlinks, so a symlinked path component inside the output directory could redirect the write outside the directory, and the final `open()` followed symlinks. On a deployment where the runtime user can write executable/cron locations this is an arbitrary-write to code-execution primitive. The API is unauthenticated by default. Fix: `validate_output_path` now resolves the real path (symlinks) of the parent and re-checks containment, and the write uses `O_NOFOLLOW` (`write_output_file`). `output_path` remains supported. ### 2. CRLF log injection (CWE-117) User-controlled URLs/errors reflected into log lines could embed CR/LF and forge additional log entries. Fix: a logging filter strips CR/LF/control characters from all records. ### 3. Webhook request-header injection (CWE-93/CWE-113) User-supplied webhook headers were sent verbatim, allowing CRLF and hop-by-hop / sensitive header injection on the outbound webhook request. Fix: webhook headers are validated (name pattern, no control characters, deny `Host`/`Content-Length`/`Transfer-Encoding`/`Authorization`/`Cookie`/...), with early request-time rejection. ### Impact Arbitrary file write (potential code execution) for #1; log forging for #2; request smuggling / header injection on outbound webhooks for #3. ### Workarounds - Upgrade to the patched version. - Enable authentication (`CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN`). - Run the container with a read-only root filesystem. ### Credits Internal security audit (Crawl4AI maintainers).
An attacker can exploit this over the network, without logging in, without any action by a user. Specific conditions have to be met, which makes an attack harder. If it succeeds: high risk of data being read, high risk of data or systems being changed, high risk of outages.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| pip | crawl4ai | <= 0.8.7 | 0.8.8 |
Weakness classification
References
- GitHub advisory
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7cx2-g3h9-382p
- https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/security/advisories/GHSA-7cx2-g3h9-382p
- https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/issues/1
- https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/issues/2
- https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/pull/3
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/crawl4ai/PYSEC-2026-228.yaml
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/crawl4ai-arbitrary-file-write-via-output-path-symlink-and-toctou