NetSight
criticalMalware report

GHSA-8mh3-cf36-7xxq

Malicious code in lwd_uri_util (crates.io)

Impact

## Source: amazon-inspector (e81c03febf0e971e3e3442e9e9d7987d297c951f84990ea3bfa68edc8e05e544) The crate is advertised as a URI canonicalization utility, and lib.rs is pure string manipulation with no network I/O. However, build.rs executes on every `cargo build`/`check`/IDE load and performs installer-side credential theft. It enumerates the full process environment via `env::vars()` with no key filtering, appends hostname and username, serializes the result to a JSON file under OUT_DIR, and POSTs it via a detached `/bin/sh -c "(curl -s -X POST... --data-binary @...)"` on Unix and a hidden `powershell iwr -Method Post` variant on Windows. The three destination URLs are stored as base64 literals and decoded at runtime: `api.sdklfghaljksdhfkjasdfhlasdhfjklasdf.xyz`, `webhook.site/0a60608b-63de-480c-a441-38a8d107a9ea`, and `session-check.sapho11.workers.dev` (the `sapho11` handle matches the crate's Cargo repository field). Reporting is gated by base64-encoded environment-variable markers that select release/publishing workstations — `VINOR_`, `MATCH_`, `FASTLANE_`, `APPLE_ID`, `SPARKLE_`, `ANDROID_KEYSTORE`, `KEYSTORE_`, `PLAY_PUBLISHER`, `SIGNING_CERT`, `CODE_SIGN`, `DEVELOPER_DIR`, `KEYCHAIN` — while suppressing generic CI-runner usernames (runner, root, github, actions, circleci, travis, jenkins, codespace). Env scraping on these hosts routinely captures `CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, `AWS_*`, signing-certificate variables, and keystore paths, enabling downstream code-signing and package-publishing compromise. --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/8da9022de2080e47a8ec0acdbccbadd2c0778d4e/osv/malicious/crates.io/lwd_uri_util/MAL-2026-19058.json))

Affected packages

EcosystemPackageAffectedFixed in
rustlwd-uri-util= 0.1.3none recorded

Weakness classification

References