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GHSA-cm62-gvxx-vmxx

Dulwich: Symlink directory traversal in stash pop allows arbitrary file write via intermediate directory symlinks

Impact

## Summary Dulwich's `stash.py:pop()` function is vulnerable to symlink directory traversal, allowing an attacker to write arbitrary files outside the repository worktree when a victim pops a stash in a malicious repository. ## Root Cause The `pop()` function at `dulwich/stash.py:236` uses `os.path.exists(parent_dir)` to check if a parent directory exists before writing stashed files. `os.path.exists()` follows symlinks, so when an intermediate directory in the path is a symlink pointing outside the worktree (e.g., `link → ../../.git/hooks`), the check passes and subsequent file writes resolve through the symlink. The `validate_path()` function (line 228) only validates path component names against `INVALID_DOTNAMES` — it performs zero filesystem symlink detection. On dulwich 1.2.7 (latest release), `build_file_from_blob()` has no symlink protection whatsoever. ## Impact An attacker can craft a malicious repository that, when a victim clones it and performs a stash pop operation, writes attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem locations. Writing to `.git/hooks/post-checkout` achieves Remote Code Execution on the victim's machine on the next git checkout operation. ## Attack Scenario 1. Attacker creates a repository with branch `main` containing `link` (symlink → `../../.git/hooks`) and branch `feature` containing `link/post-checkout` (executable payload) 2. Victim clones the repository (landing on `main` — symlink `link` exists in worktree) 3. Victim checks out `feature`, makes changes, runs `stash.push()` 4. Victim checks out `main` (restoring the `link` symlink) 5. Victim runs `stash.pop(0)` — stash contains `link/post-checkout` 6. `os.path.exists("link")` returns True (symlink to existing directory), `os.makedirs` skipped 7. `build_file_from_blob(blob, mode, "link/post-checkout")` → `open("link/post-checkout", "wb")` follows the intermediate symlink → payload written to `.git/hooks/post-checkout` 8. Next checkout operation triggers the hook → RCE ## Suggested Fix Before writing any file, verify that no component of the target path resolves through a symlink outside the worktree. Use `os.path.realpath(parent_dir)` and confirm it stays within the repository root. Alternatively, use `os.open()` with `O_NOFOLLOW` on each path component. Reported by **zx (Jace)**

An attacker can exploit this with local access to the system, without logging in, but a user has to do something, such as open a file or a link. If it succeeds: high risk of data being read, high risk of data or systems being changed, high risk of outages. The attack can reach beyond the vulnerable component itself.

Affected packages

EcosystemPackageAffectedFixed in
pipdulwich>= 0.22.5, <= 1.2.71.2.8

Weakness classification

References