GHSA-jf2q-463c-6f52
androidqf: Zip entry Name Injection in APK bundle (Zip Slip for zip consumers)
Impact
### Summary `generateZipPath()` constructs zip entry names for collected APKs using device controlled content from `extractFileName()`. Since `extractFileName()` does not reject traversal sequences, the resulting zip entry name can contain `../`. AndroidQF itself does not extract the zip it creates, but any forensic tool that extracts the acquisition bundle without zip-slip protection could write files to attacker chosen paths. ### Impact A compromised device could inject path traversal sequences into the acquisition bundle's zip entry names. When a forensic analyst or forensic tooling extracts the bundle without entry name validation, files could be written outside the intended extraction directory. ### Patched version [1.8.3](https://github.com/mvt-project/androidqf/releases/tag/v1.8.3) ### Credits This issue was identified during a security assessment conducted by 0xche.
An attacker can exploit this with local access to the system, without logging in, but a user has to be involved, for example by viewing content. If it succeeds: low risk of data or systems being changed.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| go | github.com/mvt-project/androidqf | <= 1.8.2 | 1.8.3 |