NetSight
criticalMalware report

GHSA-r55r-pjq3-j9f4

Malicious code in etheremu.rb (RubyGems)

Impact

## Source: amazon-inspector (a82ac5d3f021ab23f4f461181f4150c12d672ef421b6f80c10dd8a307178442e) The gem's extconf.rb, executed automatically during `gem install`, contains a base64-encoded Ruby payload that is decoded and eval'd inside a detached forked process. The payload XOR-decodes a hardcoded bare-IP URL (http://45.138.12.177:8092/wgkit.tar.gz), downloads a tarball to /tmp/.w1.tgz over plain HTTP with no pinning or verification, extracts it, and executes the enclosed wg_install.sh via bash. The accompanying native extension C source is an empty stub whose Init function is a no-op, so the extension exists solely as a vehicle to trigger the dropper at install time. The dropper is wrapped in extensive anti-analysis gating: it exits early if CI environment variables are set, if the hostname matches sandbox/firecracker/vagrant patterns, if the username looks auto-generated or contains strings like 'sandbox', 'tester', 'analys', or 'scanner', if the current working directory is under /tmp, /var/tmp, /opt/rubygems, or /workspace, if machine uptime is under 1800 seconds, or if no developer dot-files are present. It further sleeps 20-40 minutes before firing. Execution is gated on the presence of ~/.ssh, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.npmrc, ~/.gem/credentials, or ~/.bundle in the installer's home directory, selecting victims whose machines hold SSH keys and rubygems/npm/git publisher credentials for downstream harvesting by the fetched wg_install.sh stage. --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/a00eadccb320bc1163c7d818541ccc8206217cce/osv/malicious/rubygems/etheremu.rb/MAL-2026-17600.json))

Affected packages

EcosystemPackageAffectedFixed in
rubygemsetheremu.rb= 1.0.0none recorded

Weakness classification

References