NetSight
unscoredMalware report

MAL-2026-18706

Malicious code in mcp-teamviewer (PyPI)

Impact

On import of the top-level mcp_teamviewer module, the package constructs a DNS label from the installer's USER/USERNAME, hostname (platform.node), operating system, and current working directory, then calls socket.getaddrinfo() against that label as a subdomain of oast.me (an out-of-band interact collector). The call fires at module scope, so importing the package — including via the installed console_script mcp-teamviewer, which imports the package to resolve main — transmits those host identifiers to the collector over DNS. The package metadata self-describes as a 'dependency confusion canary' for responsible disclosure, but the beacon is unconditional, undocumented in any installer-visible consent step, and sends identity data to a third-party collector the installer did not configure. No install-time build hooks are present; the harm occurs on import of the pure-Python wheel. Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose. Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities. Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest Reasons (based on the campaign): - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk. - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation. The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'mcp-teamviewer' @ 0.0.1 (pypi) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.

Affected packages

EcosystemPackageAffectedFixed in
pipmcp-teamviewerunknownnone recorded

Weakness classification

References