MAL-2026-18747
Malicious code in genblaze-atlascloud (PyPI)
Impact
setup.py registers custom build_py and install cmdclasses that, on every `pip install` or sdist build, POST a JSON payload containing socket.gethostname(), the install path, os.getcwd(), the Python version, and a canary identifier to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://13.140.137.222:8787/_ah/dc over plain HTTP. The destination is a non-publisher bare IP, there is no opt-in, and the package name resembles an internal vendor name, so any environment whose internal dependency resolves to this public name has host and path identifiers transmitted off-host at install time. The long_description self-labels this as an 'authorized dependency-confusion canary' targeting Backblaze/Bugcrowd, but the exfiltration mechanism is identical to a hostile dependency-confusion payload and the authorization claim is author-controlled text that an installer cannot verify at install time. Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose. Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities. Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest Reasons (based on the campaign): - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk. - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| pip | genblaze-atlascloud | unknown | none recorded |