MAL-2026-19116
Malicious code in humbility-shared (PyPI)
Impact
setup.py defines a custom install cmdclass (PostInstall) that runs on `pip install` and collects installer-side identifiers — hostname, USER/USERNAME, current working directory, VIRTUAL_ENV, and CI-related environment variables — and POSTs them as JSON to a hardcoded interactsh collector at https://dbq1g44hj5j25tbieep0dmbhfakw1pyzc.oast.fun/humbility-shared, with an accompanying DNS prefetch of a package-named subdomain under the same canary host. The destination is not the installer's infrastructure and is not caller-configurable; the behavior is undisclosed and fires automatically from the sdist build on a default install when no matching wheel is available, and the shipped wheel installs the same package tree. The name and shape are consistent with a dependency-confusion canary squatting an internal package name on public PyPI to fingerprint build systems that resolve the public name instead of the intended private one. Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose. Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities. Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest Reasons (based on the campaign): - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk. - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| pip | humbility-shared | unknown | none recorded |