NetSight
unscoredMalware report

MAL-2026-19203

Malicious code in fetchium (PyPI)

Impact

The package presents itself as a small collection of web/utility helpers (greet/clamp) but ships a covert loader that executes on first import. __init__.py unconditionally invokes _loader.run() inside a bare try/except so any failure is swallowed silently. _loader.py is approximately 1.9 MB of base64+zlib-encoded chunks (the _CH tuple) plus a Windows dropper harness configured with _TARGET='MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.msi', _XARGS=['/qn','/quiet','/norestart'] and _SPAWN='wmi', consistent with silent MSI installation via msiexec/WMI impersonating a Microsoft Edge update. A base64-encoded JSON configuration bundled inside the loader enumerates analysis-environment indicators to evade (sandbox/cuckoo/joe/hybrid/anyrun names; VirtualBox/VMware/QEMU/Xen/Parallels process and registry fingerprints; debugging and monitoring tools such as wireshark, procmon, ida64, x64dbg; VM MAC OUI prefixes) and specifies Windows persistence under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with subkey Microsoft\CoreRuntime. The advertised functionality bears no relationship to this payload, the loader is undisclosed in the README, and the metadata uses placeholder values. Importing the package on a Windows host triggers decoding and execution of the opaque payload, drop/execution of an MSI masquerading as a Microsoft update, and installation of a Run-key persistence entry. During import package runs an embedded malicious executable. Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-11-fetchium Reasons (based on the campaign): - obfuscation - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - malware - persistence - peristence-autorun

Affected packages

EcosystemPackageAffectedFixed in
pipfetchiumunknownnone recorded

Weakness classification

References